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The Dams Debate: Neither ‘small’ nor ‘large’ is the question, but well-planned and 
well-managed1 
Dams as large infrastructure have a high potential for development. They can balance hy-
drological variability, both inter-annual and inter-seasonal, by storing water for all sectors 
of a national economy, and they serve as one means for controlling devastating floods. 
They are key means to exploit the huge untapped hydropower potential in particular in 
China, India, Brazil, Russia and on the African continent which lags far behind the rest of 
the world. Well-planned and well-managed they can support adaptation to changes in hy-
drology. 
No other infrastructure has attracted that much criticism than dams because of their detri-
mental negative social and ecological effects. Estimates about dam-induced displacement 
of people range in the order of 40 to 80 million, of which the lion’s share are in India and 
China. As a Canadian non-governmental organization reasoned, it is not the financial cri-
sis setting back investments to exploit a huge technical and economic potential, but “the 
notion of acceptability on social and environmental levels.” 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has set a landmark with its “Dams and Devel-
opment. New Framework for Decision-Making” released in December 2000. It is without 
doubt that the recommendations have touched key questions of how development should 
happen. However, the WCD has defined ideal type norms to guide dam-related decision-
making. Being excluded from the WCD process, the governments of the hydro-
superpowers were sceptical about the seven strategic priorities and outright rejected the 26 
guidelines. But small countries too such as Nepal and Ethiopia accused the WCD on hin-
dering their social and economic development. 
Our Institute issued the research project “Sustainable Dam Development: Between Global 
Norms and Local Practices” on behalf of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (BMZ) targeting the dam policies of the hydro-superpowers. In these econo-
mies historically, dams have contributed to the countries’ goal of achieving food and en-
ergy security, with the latter becoming at least as important if not more given the escala-
tion in the energy/electricity demands. Thus the importance of dams, in spite of being an 
extremely contested domain, continues to remain unabated. 
Acknowledging that dams are important infrastructural means for social and economic 
development, and that multilateral development banks and bilateral donors are re-
engaging in the dam business due to its renewable characteristics (low carbon energy), our 
Institute has looked into the dynamics and conditions enhancing the internalization of in-
ternational norms and standards. Country studies were conducted in India, China, Brazil 
and Turkey to find out if and how superior social and environmental norms like those of 
the WCD and the World Bank have influenced planning and implementation of large wa-
ter / hydropower infrastructure projects over the years. 
                                                 
1 This appraisal was made by Director General of UNEP, Mr Klaus Toepfer, on the occasion of the Dams 
and Development Forum taking place in September 2003 in Geneva. 
 The country studies, of which those on China, India2 and now on Brazil are available, ana-
lyse the highly complex multilevel dam-related decision-making processes being particu-
larly interested in whether, why and how planning and decision-making has been opening 
up to diverse societal interests. At the national level the evolution of social and environ-
mentally sustainable practices is being studied in detail in two specific fields, i.e. the plan-
ning procedures for mitigating negative environmental impacts, and for expropriation and 
resettlement. Since impacts are clearest at project level, analysis of individual dam cases 
focused on their specific actor constellations and the impact they had. Looking at individ-
ual projects – four in the Brazil study – we have been investigating whether international / 
domestic actors have fostered sustainable practices, and whether there have been repercus-
sions on overall policies.  
The Brazil study has shown that policy changes related to environment and resettlement 
are attributable to the general democratisation process of the country which led to rigorous 
democratic and participative procedures. Based on a cross temporal study for the last three 
decades, Agnes da Costa argues that proposals made in the WCD report in 2000 had been 
incorporated in Brazilian legislation long before the WCD had come into existence. This 
refers to, for instance, the issue of Comprehensive Option Assessment, one of the WCD’s 
strategic priorities. However, the Brazilian Regulatory Water Agency has been concerned 
about the de facto rights for indigenous and tribal people because the WCD had proposed 
that decisions on projects affecting them “are guided by their free, prior and informed con-
sent achieved through formal and informal representative bodies” (WCD 2000, 218). This 
disagreement only recently came to the fore in the disputed Belo Monte hydropower pro-
ject on the Rio Xingu, a tributary of the Amazon: although the Brazilian environmental 
agency attached the strictest conditions to it, indigenous groups in the region, nevertheless 
announced that they would defend their river and, if need be, prevent its construction by 
violent means. 
The author shows that social mobilisation and environmental awareness are two closely 
linked phenomena in Brazil, each of which has reinforced the other’s goals since the de-
mocratisation of the 1980s. The constant relationship between national social and envi-
ronmental movements and NGOs and their international counterparts; the continuous tran-
sit of individuals from the environmental sphere to different positions (e.g. working within 
the administration or for the administration); and the growing power and legitimacy of the 
Ministério Público (being responsible for protecting diffuse rights) made the internalisa-
tion of global norms happen. She assumes that in a radically changed investment envi-
ronment private investors who have substituted the role international financial institutions 
had played in the past, may now act as norm carriers – which, above all, remains to be 
seen. 
Bonn, October 2010  Waltina Scheumann 
    Dept. Environmental Policy and  
    Natural Resources Management 
                                                 
2 Oliver Hensengerth (2010): Sustainable Dam Development in China: Between Global Norms and Local 
Practices, Discussion Paper 4/2010, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik; Nirmalya Choud-
hury (2010): Sustainable Dam Development in India: Between Global Norms and Local Practices, Dis-
cussion Paper 10/2010, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
Abstract 
The paper explores the reforms of Brazil’s environmental and resettlement policies and the 
influence of domestic and external actors on its dam-related legislation and practices. It 
analyses four hydropower plant projects: Balbina and Itaparica, built during the military 
regime; Cana Brava, one of the first private projects in Brazil; and Santo Antonio, a pub-
lic-private project still under construction. The analysis begins with an overview of the 
relevance of hydropower to Brazil’s development plans since the military regime and of 
the central administration’s strategy of developing the country’s hydropower potential by 
maintaining a clean mix of energy sources for the supply of electricity. Domestic opposi-
tion to the authoritarian regime had culminated in the promulgation of a highly participa-
tion-oriented Constitution in 1988. The paper then analyses decision-making processes in 
Brazil’s dam-related bureaucracy and the role allotted to civil society since then. By sin-
gling out two problem areas – Environmental Impact Assessment and resettlement – the 
paper addresses changes in the normative framework and in practice. Case studies then 
consider these processes, taking Balbina as an example of a project with serious environ-
mental consequences, and Itaparica as a case where planning and participation did not lead 
to satisfactory implementation in resettlement terms; Cana Brava as a project that is still 
trying to cope with social compensation in an innovative way; and finally Santo Antonio 
as a possible example for future projects as regards the involvement of affected people at 
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1 Introduction 
Brazil differs from the majority of countries in terms of electricity supply in that it relies 
on renewable energy sources. Although biomass has undergone significant growth in re-
cent years compared to other sources, hydropower remains the key electricity generation 
technique. In 2007 85.2 per cent of Brazilian power was generated mainly in large hydroe-
lectric power plants, most of which relied on large reservoirs with multi-annual storage 
capacities. The operation of the transmission and generation facilities by a centralised op-
eration system observes an optimisation rule that takes the storage level at each reservoir 
and the different hydrological regimes throughout the country into consideration.  
Most of the existing reservoirs were built during the military regime (from 1964 to 1985), 
which means that, given the development and growth policies at that time, decisions to 
build large dams and flood large areas of land did not necessarily consider the resulting 
social and environmental impacts. Such decisions were normally taken on a sectoral basis. 
However, with the re-establishment of democracy and the promulgation of the Federal 
Constitution (1988; ‘CF/88’), which requires public participation in decision-making 
processes, decisions on the construction of dams and the flooding of land are now taken 
jointly by society, a number of government institutions and especially the population af-
fected.  
Furthermore, environmental legislation and standards have developed significantly since 
the promulgation of the CF/88. As hydropower is still considered necessary to meet grow-
ing demand and so to enable economic growth to continue in the country, more new dams 
are expected to be built as part of hydropower projects in Brazil. But their construction 
will be subject to a comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), addressing 
social as well as environmental impacts (i.e. resettlement issues, too) and forming part of a 
rigorous three-stage environmental licensing process.  
Parallel to these internal policy developments related to dams, the beginning of the 21st 
century saw the publication on 16 November 2000by the World Commission on Dams 
(WCD) of “Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision-Making”, setting 
out core values and recommendations for new policy frameworks to enable dams to be 
planned, constructed and operated sustainably. 
A question that then arises is how far internal dam policy frameworks have been influ-
enced not only by internal policy learning but also by the diffusion of such international 
norms as the WCD’s recommendations. In this regard, three hypotheses on pathways of 
international influence will be discussed: (i) a government’s embeddedness in interna-
tional institutions; (ii) social mobilisation within society aimed at encouraging domestic 
decision-makers to internalise and implement international standards; and (iii) the reliance 
of domestic dam developers – public and private – on foreign financial services and exper-
tise which demand the application of international standards. 
Thus an important part of the proposed analysis consists in identifying relevant actors and 
institutions, the way in which they exert influence and their links to international norm 
carriers. The contribution of these (groups of) actors to the implementation/establishment 
of current legal and sectoral frameworks and dam-related policies in Brazil is then investi-
gated. Information for these analyses was gathered in interviews. 
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To address the aforementioned questions and hypotheses, the study adopts a two-tier ap-
proach, the first focusing on the country level and the second on the project level. At coun-
try level it considers what caused Brazil’s change of attitude towards the issues of partici-
pation, environment and resettlement in the context of dams (and the resulting institutional 
changes). A subsidiary question is then whether this change of attitude has been directly or 
indirectly influenced by such international norms as those recommended by the WCD. As 
to the project level, the four cases studied resulted from the selection criteria adopted: 
choosing dams consistent with one of the three historical breakthroughs in Brazil which 
did a great deal to bring about changes in decision-making on dam-building and related 
processes,3 the promulgation of CF/88; the liberalisation of the electricity industry in the 
1990s, pushed by the “Washington Consensus”;4 and the reform of the electricity industry 
in 2003/2004 in response to electricity shortages and the 2001 energy-rationing pro-
gramme.  
As the decision-making on and construction of dams before and after CF/88, during the 
liberalisation phase and after the reform of the electricity industry in 2003/2004 have dif-
ferent characteristics, the degree to which environmental and social norms were observed 
differed in each case. As a consequence, four dams have been chosen: the first two were 
planned and built before 1988; the next one was planned later, construction starting during 
the liberalisation period; and the last one was planned even later, construction beginning 
after 2004. 
The next section addresses the strategic role of dams in Brazil. Section 3 then conducts a 
country-level analysis, depicting the decision-making framework for dams in Brazil, iden-
tifying actors and networks involved in this process and indicating political opportunities. 
Section 4 presents the various dams in their historical context, while the final section links 
the two levels of analysis and discusses whether and how the findings relate to and sub-
stantiate the three hypotheses. 
2 The strategic role of hydropower in Brazil 
The Brazilian electricity market has been growing at a sustained annual rate of 5 per cent, 
requiring the annual addition of 4,500 to 5,000 Megawatt (MW) of installed generation 
capacity to maintain economic growth. After the energy rationing in 2001, guaranteed 
energy supply is one of the main political priorities of the administration headed by Presi-
dent Lula, who was elected in 2002. 
The 10-Year Energy Plan 2007–2016 (MME 2008a) refers to the development of 90 pro-
jects by 2016 (including 19 already under construction), adding more than 36 GW of in-
stalled capacity to the system. Although the National Energy Plan 2030 (MME 2008b) 
                                                 
3 Although dams have been built in Brazil for several reasons, this paper focuses on dams built for hydro-
power generation, even though most serve multiple purposes: electricity generation, flood protection, 
navigation, domestic and industrial water supply and water for irrigated agriculture. 
4 Williamson originally coined the phrase in 1990 “to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy 
advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989” 
(Williamson 2000). 
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indicates that hydropower capacity is expected to decrease in comparison to other sources, 
it should still play a dominant strategic role. 
Electricity supply in Brazil is dependent on existing hydropower plants and on large reser-
voirs with multi-annual storage capacities. The origin of the Brazilian hydropower-based 
electricity mix is linked to the operation of the state-owned Eletrobras (Centrais Elétricas 
Brasileiras) and its subsidiaries, which invested in hydropower generation in response to 
an ambitious economic and industrialisation plan, the Target Programme, which promised 
“50 years of growth in five years” in the late 1950s, to the military government's concern 
about the geopolitical significance of the Amazon region in view of the extraordinary 
mineral wealth5 discovered there in the 1970s and to the oil crises in the same decade. Fol-
lowing the oil crises, the economic recession of the 1980s caused the postponement of a 
number of transmission projects and delayed the launch of several electricity-generating 
projects. The worsening of the Brazilian economic crisis in the early 1990s had a signifi-
cant impact on the Brazilian Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) and was marked by system-
atic delays in payments for energy supplied to state-owned utilities by federal companies 
and Itaipu Binacional. The debts of these companies reached the equivalent of US$ 5 bil-
lion and, in these circumstances, the programme of projects to be implemented, recom-
mended in Plan 2010,6 was practically halted. The construction of new hydropower plants 
is a phenomenon of the new millennium, when investment in this type of capital-intensive 
asset became viable for both public and private investors in a stable economy. 
Brazil’s economically viable hydropower potential is estimated at 260 Gigawatt (GW), of 
which only 30 per cent is either operational or under construction (World Bank 2008). 
This means that, if this potential is to be developed at levels similar to those in more de-
veloped countries, the subject of sustainable dam construction must be addressed.  
Nevertheless, in view of the social and environmental impacts of dam construction, the 
central government has been seeking to increase its knowledge of hydropower potential 
and expecting a more conscientious approach to the selection of sites to be developed. To 
this end, a number of studies, such as Integrated Environmental Evaluations (of river ba-
sins), inventories and feasibility studies, are being undertaken.  
The strategic role of hydropower in Brazil and the central government’s confidence in the 
comprehensiveness of the way this issue is being addressed has led officials to call for the 
recognition of hydropower as a renewable and sustainable source of energy. One com-
monly recognised7 event illustrating this political positioning is the role played by the 
former Minister of Mines and Energy, Mrs Dilma Rousseff, head of the Brazilian delega-
tion to the International Conference for Renewable Energies, which took place in Bonn in 
                                                 
5 Lemos (2007) and http://www.eletrobras.com, confirmed by I21082009. 
6 Systemic sector planning became a common practice in Eletrobras in the 1970s. It considered three time 
horizons: the short, medium and long term. Initially, the evolution of consumers’ markets, the availabil-
ity of primary energy sources, technological evolution and funding sources were regarded as determi-
nants of planning activity. Later, the sector added socio-environmental variables . From the 1970s to the 
1990s, six long-term planning studies were drafted: Plano 90 (drafted in 1973–74), Plano 95 (1978–79), 
Plano 2000 (1981–82), Plano 2010 (1986–87), Plano 2015 (1991–93) and Plano 2020 (1996–99) 
(Lemos 2007). 
7 As mentioned in several interviews (I05122008, I26122008, I30012009, I06022008, I12032009b, 
I13032009, I25032009, I22042009; phone call (T11032009). 
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2004. In that it included large hydropower plants in the category of renewable energy 
sources (CEPEL 2004), her intervention was decisive for the outcomes of the Conference. 
The Political Declaration (Programa Chile Sustentable 2004) agreed by government offi-
cials makes no reference to hydropower plants, while the Resolution for the International 
Parliamentary Forum on Renewable Energies (2004) explicitly refers to hydropower as 
renewable. 
Despite the central administration’s strategy of developing the country’s hydropower po-
tential by maintaining a clean mix of energy sources for the supply of electricity (MME 
2007, 621), it has encountered strong resistance to the implementation of this strategy. A 
sign of this political difficulty is the growing number of thermal generation plants con-
tracted to supply the market in the years to come, since the government has been having 
difficulty obtaining the environmental licences needed before hydropower projects can be 
handed over to project developers.  
The increasing role to be played by thermal plants in supplying electricity has, on the other 
hand, been sharply criticised by society in general (Goldemberg 2009; IRN 2009; Novaes 
2009). There are many explanations for this paradoxical behaviour: the trade-offs (in 
terms of environmental and supply costs) related to this issue may not be clear to society 
as a whole; groups in society with differing interests have difficulty reconciling their 
views and finding a way forward; and veto instances or access points at the decision-
making process have been successful in blocking the government strategy of increasing 
the supply of hydropower. 
3 Changing policies and decision-making frameworks for dams in Brazil 
3.1 Triggers of change 
Political developments relating to the construction of dams in the periods discussed in this 
paper contributed to and were affected by global trends. While a new democracy confident 
of its participative and decentralized foundations was built in 1988 as a reaction to 20 
years of dictatorial military regime, the successor governments were constrained by the 
changes in the global political economy. In Brazil the responses to the oil crises of the 
1970s differed: the first gave rise to an ambitious development strategy highly dependent 
on foreign lending and on state indebtedness, whereas the second aggravated the debt cri-
sis that marked the 1980s, known in Brazil as “the Lost Decade”. However, at the end of 
that decade Brazil, like other developing countries, was confronted with a foreign agenda, 
the “Washington Consensus”, that reoriented its economic policy away from development 
policies in which the state played a strong role to a more liberal market economy that re-
lied on private investment. This is the political and economic context in which the deci-
sion-making framework began to evolve. 
3.1.1 Democratization of the country: the Federal Constitution of 1988 
The worst examples of Brazilian hydropower projects in terms of environmental and so-
cial impacts were built during the military regime. It was argued that they were crucial for 
the country’s development, which was based on the growth of the economy and industrial 
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activity. A supply of cheap electricity was considered essential for the success of this 
strategy.  
Brazil faced a slow transition from military to civilian government (from 1974 to 1989) at 
a time of economic slowdown, which, on one hand, strengthened the opposition to the 
regime and to its development strategy and, on the other, enabled a positive association of 
concepts related to democracy, such as participation and decentralization, with those re-
lated to environmental protection. The reinforcement of democratic values began with an 
amnesty in 1979, which prompted the return of activists with new ideas and strategies. 
This was followed by the publication of a law on the protection of “diffuse interests”,8 
which was passed in 1985 (Law 7347). This movement culminated in the promulgation of 
a participation-oriented Constitution in 1988, as democratisation exerted pressure for a 
wider distribution of power and decision-making, both within state institutions and be-
tween them and societal organisations (Hochstetler / Keck 2007). The Brazilian Constitu-
tion of 1988 is therefore regarded as the Civilian Constitution (Constituição Cidadã),9 its 
longest article being devoted to the protection of the rights of the individual (Article 5). 
According to Hochstetler / Keck (2007, 13), democratisation was also the origin of the 
Brazilian concept of socio-environmentalism, since it convinced environmentalists “(…) 
to broaden the social bases of their appeal to be able to influence newly democratic deci-
sion-making processes in a context of economic crisis (…) Based on this experience, many 
environmental movements in Brazil have focused as much on social equity and participa-
tion as on protecting the environment.” 
The Constitution itself was a result of a participative process which can be attributed to the 
broad and intense incidence of popular amendments during the constituent process. At the 
end of the process, 122 popular amendments (meaning 12,277,423 signatures and at least 
4 million citizens10) were presented to the assembly, 83 of them being adopted. The gains 
achieved by these popular amendments included the recognition of the rights of the In-
dian11 (claimed by the Catholic Church, by the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Sci-
ence and by associations of anthropologists and geologists), the entitlement of associations 
to submit acts of unconstitutionality (ações de inconstitucionalidade) to the Supreme 
Court (claimed by businessmen and by a popular committee in the state of Rondônia) and 
the creation of the popular initiative of drafting laws (iniciativa popular de leis) (claimed 
by several associations) (Lopes 2008, 55–58). 
The 1988 Constitution altered the framework for decision-making on the construction of 
dams. Two problem areas covered by CF/88 should be highlighted as possibly having the 
greatest impact on this framework: (i) the distribution of powers under the federative pact 
and (ii) the protection of the environment.12 
                                                 
8 Diffuse interests or rights are those interests or rights shared by a group, class or an indeterminate cate-
gory of individuals in the same situation. 
9 Also mentioned by I09032009 and I25032009. 
10 Each voter was allowed to sign no more than three amendments. 
11 A whole chapter of CF/88 (Title VIII, Chapter VIII, articles 231 and 232) is dedicated to this subject. 
12 Article 5, LXXIII; article 23, VI; Article 24, VI; Article 24, VIII; Article 129, III; Article 170, VI; Arti-
cle 174, § 3º; Article 186, II; Article 200, VIII; Article 220, II; and the whole of Chapter IV of Title VII 
(Article 225). 
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Brazil is a Federative Republic composed of twenty-six states and a federal district. Its 
decentralised nature dates from its independence, being reflected in all the eight constitu-
tions since then, but strengthened by the most recent, adopted in 1988. Brazil’s federal 
system has three constitutionally designated levels of political authority: the federation 
(usually called the Nation, the Union or the State), the states and the municipalities. Each 
has elected executive and legislative branches. 
Because of the 20 years of dictatorial military regime, which concentrated many of the 
decisions and resources at federal level, CF/88 guarantees that responsibilities, resources 
and powers13 were shared among the three levels. The powers of the states are known as 
residual powers, since they are the powers which the Constitution does not explicitly pro-
hibit the states to exercise (Article 25(1)), resulting in vague constitutional mandates, as 
pointed out by Hochstetler / Keck (2007, 14). 
As a result of decentralised principles and consequent jurisdictional conflicts, Brazilian 
Federalism, known as the “federative pact”, has been trying to find a way to deal with de-
cision-making on projects or policies that have national repercussions, such as the con-
struction of new hydropower plants. Thus, at national level, this decision-making process 
must consider the distribution of powers throughout the federation, the many actors who 
may have conflicting interests and rights of veto in certain subject areas.  
The drafting of the legislation specifically concerning the environment, which is also cov-
ered by CF/88, began in the 1980s, when shared powers became a principle: Article 10 of 
Law 6938/81 (which created the National Environmental Policy) and Articles 4 and 5 of 
Resolution 237 of the National Council on the Environment (CONAMA) of 29 December 
1997 form the legal bases for the shared powers of the three levels of government.  
CONAMA laid down general rules defining the jurisdiction of the Brazilian Institute for 
the Environment and Natural Renewable Resources (IBAMA). IBAMA is therefore re-
sponsible for the licensing and inspection of potentially or effectively polluting activities 
that have a national or regional impact, concern two or more states or are located on the 
border with other countries, on Indian lands or on areas protected by the Union and activi-
ties involving nuclear materials. CONAMA assigned to the environmental agencies of the 
states, the federal district and to implementing bodies the authority to license and inspect 
potentially or effectively polluting activities affecting two or more municipalities or for-
ests and other forms of natural permanently protected vegetation. Furthermore, CONAMA 
made the municipal level responsible for the licensing and inspection of projects with a 
local impact. 
One consequence of federalism as applied to the environment is the considerable variation 
in subnational environmental policies and practices accompanied by conflicting norms. 
This may make for greater flexibility and consideration of local specificities but also, in 
                                                 
13 The Constitution establishes the property of the Union (which includes rivers that flow through more 
than one state or along or across borders with neighboring countries) (Article 20); the powers of the Un-
ion (Article 21), areas on which the Union has exclusive power to legislate (Article 22); powers shared 
by the Union, states and municipalities (Article 23); areas on which the Union, states and municipalities 
have the power to legislate concurrently (Article 24); the property of the states (Article 26); the powers 
of the municipalities (Article 30). The constitutional order contains further indications of shared and ex-
clusive powers of the Union, states and municipalities, such as those concerning taxation. 
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processes involving the construction of hydropower plants, for example, differences in the 
standard and quality of environmental licensing processes and studies. In some cases, this 
is solved in practice in a rather informal way, as observed by Hochstetler / Keck (2007), 
with IBAMA sometimes asked to take over the environmental licensing process that is the 
responsibility of a state environmental agency.14 This causes further delays in the issuing 
of environmental licenses, increasing associated risks and costs.15 
As for water resources, CF/88 assigns the ownership of rivers that flow through two or 
more states or along or across borders with neighbouring countries to the Union (cf. Arti-
cle 20). Article 21 also delegates to the Union responsibility for creating the National Sys-
tem for the Management of Water Resources, i.e. the institution ruling water resources 
issues in view of the federative pact.16  
With respect to indigenous communities, Article 231(1) of CF/88 recognises the indige-
nous groups’ original right to the lands traditionally occupied by them (those used for liv-
ing, for production activities and for their cultural and physical reproduction). Neverthe-
less, indigenous lands are federal lands forming part of the Union’s exclusive domain, 
and, as stated above, the exploitation of water resources on these lands is subject to previ-
ous legislative authorisation, which entitles indigenous communities to be heard at spe-
cific public hearings (Article 231[3]). Considering that much of Brazil’s remaining hydro-
power potential lies in the Amazon region (MME, 2008b), where the majority of indige-
nous groups live, the role of the National Congress in dam decision-making is expected to 
grow in the years to come. 
The protection of indigenous groups’ rights is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, 
its associated foundation, the Brazilian National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) and the Min-
istério Público. In civil society, the indigenous organisations that fight for indigenous 
rights include the CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário – Indigenous Missionary 
Council), which is linked to the Catholic Church, the CCPY (Comissão Pró-Yanomami – 
Pro-Yanomami Commission) and the COIAB (Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas 
da Amazônia Brasileira – Coordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Brazilian 
Amazon). Nevertheless, some claim that indigenous groups are easily manipulated17 by 
preservationist Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) seeking to block the construction 
of such infrastructure as hydropower plants, given their constitutional prerogatives. The 
preservationist NGOs’ fight for indigenous rights is consistent with the approach men-
tioned by Hochstetler / Keck (2007) of engaging in a socio-environmentalist discourse, 
which also attracts international attention in view of the sensitiveness of the indigenous 
rights issue in the global arena. 
                                                 
14 Also addressed by I30012009 and World Bank (2008, 37), which mentions the case of the UHE 
Itumirim, the Preliminary Licencse for which was issued by the environmental agency of the state of 
Goiás, in view of the vagueness of the term ‘local/regional environmental impact’. Following a question 
by the Ministério Público the judicial authority decided in favour of this Ministry, and the process had to 
be restarted, this time conducted by IBAMA. 
15 This constitutes a subtheme of the World Bank’s study (2008). 
16 Kelman / Veras (2008) point to the most important constitutional provisions with respect to hydroelec-
tricity and the construction of dams: Article 20( VII); Article 21(XXII((b); Articles 21 and 175; Article 
22(IV); Article 49(XVI); and Article 176. 
17 I25032009, I04032009 and da Costa (1997). 
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The concern of the legislative branch for the environment is generally welcomed by soci-
ety.18 One visible consequence is that the environment has been taken up by all the parties 
of the political spectrum19 and that the Environmental Parliamentary Front (Frente Parla-
mentar Ambientalista20) is composed of 12 (of the 80) senators and 465 (of the 513) depu-
ties. 
On the other hand, although Congress members may share environmental concerns, they 
may also welcome projects that have the potential to attract new investment to their re-
gions. Hydropower plants are under a constitutional obligation to pay financial compensa-
tion. This is ruled by the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL),21 and in 
2009, 22 states and 634 municipalities were entitled to financial compensation, which 
amounted to R$ 1,647 million (this amount comprises also the royalties paid by the bina-
tional Itaipu hydropower plant, which are governed by another, similar distributive rule) 
corresponding to almost 0.1 per cent of Brazil’s gross domestic product in that year. The 
interest of the legislative branch in these projects must not therefore be overlooked, even if 
the resources are in fact managed by the executive branches at each level of the federation. 
Even elected representatives from political parties which are in opposition benefit from 
having supported a project that increased government revenues.  
As mentioned above, much of Brazil’s undeveloped hydropower potential lies in the re-
gions with the lowest population density, which are also, in practical terms, the poorest 
and least developed regions. Consequently, the legislative branches of states and munici-
palities and their executive branches do not usually oppose hydropower projects since they 
see them as a way of gaining access to investment of national interest, using their support 
as a bargaining chip.22 This bargaining position is also verified during the environmental 
licensing process, when all sorts of demands and social activities (such as the distribution 
of food baskets for the poor, the provision of healthcare facilities, the construction of 
schools, all for people totally unaffected by the proposed scheme) that have no bearing on 
environmental impacts per se are regarded as compensation for those impacts (World 
Bank 2008, 20). 
One important issue to be addressed following the changes caused by CF/88 to the deci-
sion-making framework for the construction of hydropower plants is the relationship be-
tween social movements and NGOs and the apparatus of state, in view of the behaviour of 
individuals of organised civil society who constantly migrate from the governmental to the 
non-governmental sphere and so form a symbiotic relationship between NGOs and social 
movements on the one hand and the administration on the other, especially in the envi-
ronmental field. Bernardo (2001, 51–52) mentions that the Ministry of Environment 
(MMA) is usually regarded as a large NGO right in the middle of the State, an impression 
corroborated by some interviewees.23 She argues that the proximity of civil society organi-
                                                 
18 I05122008 and I06022009.  
19 I05122008. 
20 Online: http://www.frenteambientalista.com, last access on 04 July 2010. 
21 Online: http://www.aneel.gov.br/area.cfm?idArea=280, last access on 20 July 2009. 
22 I13032009. 
23 I06022009, I12032009b, I29042009, I13032009, I12032009c. On the other hand, because personnel 
shortages in the State grew during the 1990s, the fact that the State looked for experts in specific fields 
where this know-how already existed is not a peculiarity of the environmental field. 
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sations to the State and to the formulation of environmental policies grew in the 1990s, 
when the State also backed sustainable development in environmental policies. Until then 
the concept of command and control had persisted in environmental policies, this being 
inconsistent with the State’s limited capacity to exercise control and impose penalties. 
Bernardo points out that the approximation of the State and NGOs occurred mainly be-
cause of changes to the requirements of the providers of international resources. This type 
of resource has been critical not only for Brazilian (environmental) NGOs, but also, as 
Bernardo emphasizes, for the expansion of public environmental institutions, which have 
historically relied on foreign resources. 
On the subject of the relevance of foreign resources to NGOs and social movements, 
Hochstetler / Keck (2007) observe that the 1990s was a decade in which international at-
tention and abundant resources were directed to environmental issues in Brazil. Interna-
tional environmental organisations established in Brazil became more professional and 
internationally present than their Brazilian counterparts,24 having been more successful in 
advocating against dams and hydropower generation. 
International funding became vital for the implementation of environmental policies in 
Brazil after 1992, when the State began to play a decisive role in the circulation of foreign 
resources in the environmental field, since large sums had accumulated in programmes in 
which it acted as intermediary between the funding source and NGOs (Bernardo 2001, 
52). The leading financial institutions were the World Bank, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development Programme. Bernardo argues 
that it was mainly due to these institutions that consultation mechanisms were consoli-
dated and public participation in environmental policies was ensured, these being made 
conditions for the loans they allocated. Financial institutions realised that integrating 
NGOs into the implementation of the funded programme was a way of avoiding the ineffi-
ciency of the official use of resources since it ensured that they reached the target group 
and contributed to the achievement of local goals. NGOs thus became instruments of pub-
lic policies at the target, which the aforementioned financial institutions and the admini-
stration were virtually incapable of reaching directly. The partnership with NGOs was also 
advantageous to the State as a means of satisfying financial needs in the environmental 
sphere. 
With the passage of time, however, the link between the State and NGOs in this field be-
came more complex because of individual relations and combinations of events. In other 
words, the individuals who deal with environmental policies in Brazil and, as a rule, act 
consistently in this respect may be found in different positions at different times: they may 
be working within the administration, for the administration (as consultants), in NGOs as 
partners of the administration, or in NGOs opposed to certain activities of the administra-
tion. This behaviour of Brazilian environmentalists has also been addressed by Hochstetler / 
Keck (2007). The conflict of interests due to the changing positions of these individuals 
cannot be ignored, however. 
In addition, this “democratic bureaucratic regime” (Lopes 2008) may also help to explain 
why the public administration is still present in situations that could be left to private ac-
                                                 
24 With a few exceptions, e.g. S.O.S. Mata Atlântica. The profile and level of professionalisation of Brazil-
ian environmental NGOs are also addressed by Hochstetler / Keck (2007). 
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tors. The administration has been playing an important role as an intervening and mediat-
ing agent in negotiated agreements between project developers and affected people since 
2003. The role played by the Ministério Público (which will be considered in greater de-
tail below), which is a public institution as well as an intervening and mediating agent, and 
its use of Protocols for Adjustment of Public Conduct (TACs) also demonstrate that the 
presence of a public entity is important in giving validity to negotiated solutions. In this 
regard, the complaint25 about the administration generally intervening in or coordinating 
discussions (not encouraging, therefore, the free membership drive – associativismo) may 
be considered pertinent. 
3.1.2 From economic liberalisation and privatisation to energy rationing  
(1995–2001) 
The 1990s were marked by fundamental changes in Brazil’s economic policy aimed at 
establishing a new currency (Plano Real, from 1994), opening markets to competition and 
reducing national indebtedness. The administration also tried to implement the liberal con-
cept of the State: as policy-maker and regulator rather than the owner of economic assets. 
Consequently, one of the main results in this period was a major transfer of economic as-
sets from the State to the private sector under the National Privatisation Programme 
(PND) created by Law 8301 in 1990. 
Until the privatisation programme of 1995 the main investor in the hydropower industry 
had been Eletrobras, a semi-public holding company controlled by the Union.26 As the 
“Concessions Act” of 1995 satisfied the constitutional requirement that tenders be organ-
ized for all new public service concessions, including new hydropower plants, private 
companies began investing in these projects. They included such international companies 
as Tractebel (from the Belgian group SUEZ), Endesa and Neoenergia27 (both of Spanish 
origin), which, as da Costa (2002) and CEPAL (2005) point out, were attracted by the re-
cently achieved macroeconomic stability (through the Plano Real of 1994, which suc-
ceeded in controlling inflation) and by the growth potential of the energy market in Brazil 
compared with its rather stable counterpart in Europe. Some of the private investors are 
also of Brazilian origin, an example being the CPFL Energy Group. From 2003 to 2009 
installed capacity in generation projects (different sources) rose to 22,384 MW at a total 
investment of R$ 31,995.5 million, with private investors accounting for 81 per cent of 
this amount. 
Other relevant private agents in the electricity industry whose participation in the process 
was strengthened by economic liberalisation are the machinery and supply industries and 
contractors companies of national and foreign origin. They dominate in the construction of 
dams for hydropower generation, and their participation in such projects as shareholders is 
gaining ground. Other investors whose role has been growing since the 1990s are pension 
funds and BNDES Participações (BNDESPAR), the investment company of the Brazilian 
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES).  
                                                 
25 I13022009a. 
26 Empresa estatal e sociedade de economia mista. 
27 Banco do Brasil and Previ (Banco do Brasil’s pension fund) are also Neoenergia shareholders. 
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BNDES, which is linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Exchange, 
played a major role in financing privatisations during the National Privatisation Pro-
gramme and is now the main long-term source of finance for investment in all branches of 
the economy. The bank is the main financial institution for hydropower plants in Brazil, 
offering the cheapest loans in the market. BNDES is also engaged in indirect financing 
through accredited financial institutions (almost entirely financial institutions operating in 
the Brazilian banking sector), which means that private banks as well as other state-owned 
banks are involved in the financing of new hydropower projects, but usually with re-
sources from BNDES. It is important to realise that many of these banks are signatories to 
the Equator Principles (Cardoso 2008). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a few recent 
projects partially financed by multilateral agencies or regional development banks, such as 
the Cana Brava and UHE Campos Novos hydropower plants (UHEs), which relied on re-
sources from the IADB and began operating in 2002 and 2007, respectively. 
It was also during the 1990s that the restructuring of the regulatory model of the Brazilian 
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) began in line with the liberal doctrine of exposing this 
industry to a greater degree of competition in order to achieve economic efficiency. In 
practice, the goals were to replace the previous vertically integrated model, based on natu-
ral monopoly concepts, with a new system founded on free price formation, competition 
and separation of generation, transmission, distribution and commercialisation activities. 
This first phase of the sectoral reform featured the implementation of the Restructuring the 
Brazilian Electricity Supply Industry Project, or RESEB.28  
Although the government had made efforts to create a market environment, the proposed 
model gave rise to many problems, and the first market-oriented reform ran into trouble, 
which led to a supply crisis that lasted from June 2001 to February 2002. It culminated in 
an electricity rationing plan, with the State forcing all classes of consumers to reduce elec-
tricity consumption by 20 per cent. 
This energy rationing was caused by low rainfall, which had reduced reservoir levels (at 
that time, hydropower plants produced 90 per cent of the electricity supply), by the deple-
tion of the reservoirs in the 1980s, but mainly by a lack of expansion of the installed ca-
pacity of power generation projects.29 The rationing highlighted the need for the revision 
of the institutional model of the Brazilian ESI, which, despite having undergone a process 
of “revitalisation” towards the close of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s govern-
ment, was reformulated by President Lula’s administration (2003). 
                                                 
28 The most important institutional innovations in the Brazilian ESI regulatory framework established 
under the RESEB Project were the creation of the National Council for Energy Policy, with responsibil-
ity for proposing national energy policies, of the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) as 
an independent regulatory entity, of the National Power System Operator, with responsibility for con-
trolling power generation and transmission activities in the interconnected electricity system through a 
tight pool dispatch system, and of the Wholesale Electric Energy Market, responsible for undertaking all 
electricity purchase and sale transactions and for promoting the accounting of agents’ transactions in the 
multilateral short-term market under market rules. 
29 For more details on the causes and diagnosis of the electricity supply crisis in Brazil, see Melo / Neves / 
da Costa (2009). 
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3.1.3 New government and new role for the state in the Brazilian electricity supply 
industry from 2003 
The energy rationing of 2001 and the consequent reduction of economic growth, which 
gave rise to social criticism and dissatisfaction, may be considered a historical circum-
stance (or political opportunity) that caused relevant changes to policies affecting dams in 
Brazil. The New Model of the Electricity Sector of 2003/2004 resulted in the resumption 
by the State of its planning role (as acknowledged by the World Bank 2008), and led the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (responsible for this function) to become proactively in-
volved in such related areas as the environment and water resources and to interact more 
frequently with the Presidential Staff Office (Casa Civil, responsible for the coordination 
and integration of government action) and the Ministry of Environment (with its associ-
ated institutions), among others.  
As a consequence, since March 200430 the electricity policy has changed substantially,31 
primarily to attract the investment needed to guarantee the development of the sector. To 
attract investment in generation, long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) – 15 and 
30 years (in which the delivery period of the energy is fixed, as well as the day on which 
the project must start operating)32 – have been auctioned with a view to controlling energy 
contracting by the distribution utilities. The aim of this scheme is to reduce the risks to 
investors (who can then raise long-term loans for their projects with the backing of their 
PPAs). The auction by least/lowest price stimulates economic efficiency and in principle 
gives correct signals for the cost of expanding the system through competition 
The long-term PPA made BNDES the major financier of hydropower plants in Brazil. 
This was acknowledged by all the interviewees,33 who gave several reasons for this devel-
opment, the most important being the following: 
— Multilateral financial institutions had been the major financial backers of infrastruc-
ture projects implemented by the State in Brazil until the 1970s, but they have re-
frained from financing new infrastructure projects since then because their new 
agenda has focused on market reforms and because of pressure from NGOs.34 
— After a decade of sectoral adjustments and reforms (the 1990s), a period in which 
investment in new infrastructure was unsuccessfully left to private investors (with 
great hopes of foreign investment) and in which macroeconomic stabilisation was 
achieved, the State was ready to reestablish its goals and propose its own agenda. 
— The reform of the ESI in 2003, following the very unpopular energy rationing of 
2001, identified and solved a major problem created by the previous reform, which 
had been based solely on the self- organising capacity of the free market: the need 
for a predictable cash-flow for hydropower plants, which are highly dependent on 
long-term capital. The energy sales auction, which resulted in a 30-year Power Pur-
chase Agreement for the energy-selling agent (and, in this case, the developer of the 
                                                 
30 For more details on this new phase of the reform at the Brazilian ESI (and of the reform as a whole), see 
Correia et al. (2005, 2006); Melo et al. (2007); Melo / Neves / da Costa (2009) and Araújo et al. (2008). 
31 With the publication of Law 10848 and Decrees 5081, 5163, 5177 and 5184. 
32 Agents who do not meet these requirements are liable to severe penalties. 
33 The financing of hydropower plants was discussed with a total of 12 interviewees. 
34 For more information, see da Costa (2002) and Mallaby (2004). 
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new hydropower plant project), made it possible for BNDES to finance these pro-
jects by a “project finance” procedure (adding an alternative to the standard corpo-
rate financing)35 for the least expensive resource on the market.  
— In addition, possibly unlike international financial institutions, BNDES trusts the 
severity of the environmental licensing process. It also controls and monitors the use 
of resources to satisfy the conditions set out in the environmental licences (concern-
ing compensatory and mitigating environmental and social measures to be taken by 
the investor) since the bank’s employees are considered personally liable for the en-
vironmental crimes defined in the environmental legislation.36 
— BNDES is, moreover, one of the world’s largest development banks and one of the 
few institutions in the world that can afford exposure to the risk inherent in such 
large individual projects as hydropower plants. Being a development bank, it has 
operational policies that may favour investments with long maturation periods, 
unlike commercial banks, which may prefer short-term returns. 
As to the administration’s call for feasible projects, the main change introduced by this 
model was that only projects equipped with a preliminary environmental licence might be 
included in the portfolio of projects to be auctioned. This requirement was introduced to 
avoid reliance on energy which could not be offered as a consequence of environmental 
(and social) problems preventing the construction of the project. When President Lula’s 
administration took office in 2003, it inherited a long list37 of unbuilt hydropower plants 
and of dissatisfied investors (holding the concession rights) complaining about an envi-
ronmental licensing process whose outcome was unpredictable. 
The projects proposed by the administration also reveal a major change in the planning 
and study phases for hydropower projects. The previous, more liberal model permitted any 
agent interested in studying and planning a hydropower project to seek authorisation from 
the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) to carry out inventory and feasibil-
ity studies. ANEEL was able to issue study authorisations to more than one agent, having, 
at the end of the study phase, to choose the best study (the criterion being the best devel-
opment of hydraulic potential)38 on which to base the standards for the auction39 and for 
future construction.40 The innovation introduced by the “New Model” was that the Energy 
Research Company (EPE, linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy), a specialised tech-
nical and public institution created in 2004 with the main objective of conducting the nec-
essary research and planning in the energy sector, has since been permitted to study and 
propose future hydropower plants. In this context, decision-making on future plants is ex-
pected to become more coordinated and integrated from the earliest stages, with the public 
interest therefore becoming the target function of the decision (which was not necessarily 
                                                 
35 In a “project finance” procedure, the loan guarantee accepted by the banks is the project cash flow, 
whereas in the case of “corporate financing” banks ask project developers for corporate guarantees, such 
as stocks. In view of the size of this type of project, the more project developers become involved in dif-
ferent projects, the fewer corporate guarantees each has to provide. 
36 I13022009b and T23072009 (see Law 9605/1998 and Law 6938/1981) 
37 According to I06022009, this list consisted of 45 projects. 
38 In accordance with Article 5 of Law 9074/1995. 
39 In respect of expected costs, budget and prices. 
40 I06022009. In this case, the cost of all alternative studies is reimbursed to the agents who financed them. 
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Figure 1:  Investors’ main responsibilities prior to the „New Model of the Electricity Sector“  















Source: Own compilation 
Figure 1, which summarises the main responsibilities assigned to the investor in the previ-
ous model, shows that investors played the predominant) role in the former framework, 
being responsible for studies and for applying for all sorts of permits and licences. The 
new framework, on the other hand, gives the government a more important role, allowing 
the investor to act from the basic project phase onwards. While this may make for a more 
centralised decision-making process in the hands of the government, it also means that the 
decisions are to be taken in a more coordinated manner, given the involvement of different 
areas and levels of government. Moreover, this trend may preclude conflicts of interests, 
since investors usually put a great deal of effort into minimising costs in order to improve 
project profitability. It also makes the government more accountable for its decisions. 
3.2 Specific decision-making processes in dam-related policy arenas  
In Brazil decisions on the construction of hydropower dams are governed by legislation 
and policies in three public policy areas: energy, water resources and the environment.  
Energy policies are framed in a multi-level policy area whose main institutions have been 
created since the first market-oriented reform (Figure 2). 
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In this regard, one important function of the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), with 
the support of the EPE, is to assess options on different planning horizons through the de-
velopment of plans for the expansion41 of Brazil’s energy and electricity industries, such 
as the National Energy Plan (PNE), studies of Brazil’s future energy mix, the Hydroelec-
tric Inventory of Hydrographic Basins and the 10-Year Energy Expansion Plan (PDEE), 
which are submitted for public discussion.42 
As to the participative feature of energy planning in Brazil, provision is made for public 
consultations, although they are a recent innovation and may have room for improvement. 
The Ministério Público, for example, recommended MME to extend the period of public 
consultation under PDEE 2009 and to make further public announcements, since the 
original period was set to begin on Christmas Eve 2008 and to end in January of the fol-
lowing year.43 Although this recommendation was accepted, the Ministerio Público never-
theless promoted a public hearing on the PDEE at its headquarters in Brasília. 
It should be realised that the discussion of energy planning still attracts the attention only 
of organised civil society, including universities,44 and that Brazilian society as a whole is 
still not45 – or is only just becoming46 – interested in participating in this kind of debate, 
                                                 
41 For more details, see MME (2007, 2008a, 2008b) and EPE (2006). 
42 Zimmermann (2007, 207–208) mentions, in the case of PNE 2030, that the EPE organised several the-
matic meetings for various aspects of the plan to be discussed with invited experts, while the MME or-
ganised nine public seminars to discuss the studies of demand and supply (from different energy 
sources). 
43 I04032009. 
44 I13022009b and I13032009. 
45 I26122008, I04032009, I06022009 and I30012009. 
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although it may take an interest in the consequences of the decisions made.47 Although the 
final impact of participation in the planning phase may be considered low, the pressure 
exerted by society has already proved capable of changing such projects as the UHE Belo 
Monte (auctioned in 2010), which means that participation is indeed able to influence re-
sults in Brazil. 
The energy sector has more experience of planning than other industries.48 It began con-
sidering the socio-environmental variable in its studies in the 1980s, in response to the 
questioning of the environmental impacts of hydropower projects implemented in the 
1970s and 1980s and to pressure from international bodies, and especially financial insti-
tutions, which called for environmental aspects to be taken into account from the early 
stages of the planning cycle at that time.49 The EPE is also responsible for conducting the 
studies that lead to the Integrated Environmental Evaluation (AAI)50 of hydrographic ba-
sins, with the focus on hydropower development. This responsibility resulted from a Pro-
tocol for Adjustment of Public Conduct issued by the Ministério Público as a condition for 
the continuation of the licensing of the UHE Barra Grande. The EPE developed the first 
AAI in 2005, for the Uruguay river basin. Since then, a further seven river basins have 
been the subject of an AAI. This is, however, very limited coverage, when it is remem-
bered that Brazil has 12 hydrographic regions and 56 planning units. 
An AAI thus enables a basin to be described, its fragilities and potentialities to be identi-
fied (temporal and spatial evaluation of cumulative and synergic impacts), directives to the 
power sector which must be borne in mind in the environmental licensing of new and the 
management of existing hydro plants to be defined and detailed and complementary pro-
grammes to be recommended to other sectors. AAIs are also subject to at least two public 
hearings in the process of their elaboration, the first being held when potential conflicts 
are being identified, the second when the preliminary conclusions and directives are pre-
sented.51 The AAI of the Uruguay river basin entailed sixteen public consultation semi-
nars.52 
Taking the water resource and environmental policy areas into consideration, Figure 3 
shows that related decisions take place in the same arena. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
46 I16012009 and I12022009. 
47 I05122008. 
48 Previously undertaken by Eletrobras and now by MME/EPE. 
49 For more details, see EPE (2006). 
50 Given the differences between AAI and Strategic Environmental Evaluation, an AAI would be what the 
World Bank considers to be a sectoral Strategic Environmental Evaluation (I12022009). 
51 For more details, see EPE (2007). 
52 I12022009. 
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Source: Own compilation 
The management of water resources follows a unique pattern that extends beyond the Bra-
zilian federative system. If river basins are viewed as spatial units (based on the French 
system),53 each with its own committee and plan, a new paradigm in terms of decentralisa-
tion and participation in decision-making processes emerges. Water resource policies en-
tail a high degree of public participation in decision-making, as ANA points out:  
“Brazil has an extremely advanced legal and institutional framework as far as water re-
sources management is concerned. A modern and innovative ‘praxis’ complements this 
contemporary legal framework, thus placing Brazil amongst the world leading countries 
with regard to democratic, participative, environmental and politically sustainable man-
agement of its water resources. The democratization of water management in Brazil is the 
outcome of decades of mobilization, public awareness, and negotiation amongst legitimate 
stakeholders from all interested sectors; it is the product of governance settlements being 
built throughout different spatial levels of management as from the establishment of River 
Basin Committees, which are in fact Water Parliaments, decision-making boards, consti-
tuted by legitimate representatives who are democratically elected within the stake-
holders’ segment which they represent: civil society, private sector and government” 
(ANA 2003, 7). 
                                                 
53 A sign of international norm diffusion, in this case mainly through environmentalists who worked in the 
administration. 
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As a result, the National System for the Management of Water Resources,54 provided for 
in Article 21 of CF/88 and set up under Law 9433 of 8 January 1997,55 is composed of the 
following organisations with shared powers: 
— The Ministry of Environment and state secretariats are responsible for formulating 
water resource policies. 
— The Brazilian Water Regulatory Agency and state water resource agencies are re-
sponsible for implementing the system, for granting rights to use water resources 
and for monitoring. 
— Basin Committees, which are highly participative in composition, are responsible for 
deciding on water resource plans (which must be drawn up at central, state and basin 
levels) and on how to charge for the use of water resources.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that it is not yet clear what effects the water policies are 
having. While the current legislation requires decisions on dams to be based on basin 
plans, prepared by the appropriate river basin committee, basin committees are not yet 
functioning and plans have not yet been generally developed. 
3.2.1 A three-stage environmental licensing process 
Brazil’s environmental legislation dates back to 31 August 1981, when the Brazilian Envi-
ronmental Policy (PNMA) was adopted56 and the National Environmental System  
(SISNAMA) and CONAMA were established. As the Federal Prosecution Office (2004) 
points out, Brazilian environmental legislation was formulated in a context of growing 
environmental concerns in the 1970s and of increasing demands from the World Bank and 
IADB, for example, for environmental studies on projects which they were financing (in-
cluding the Tucuruí and Sobradinho hydropower plants). This was also a time of greater 
social mobilisation against the social and ecological consequences of major development 
projects implemented by the military regime, the reaction to these projects constituting a 
focus of opposition to the regime itself. 
The CF/88 maintained this concern. Many of its articles address the importance of the 
environment and of its protection, calling both for the preservation of the country’s cul-
tural heritage (including those of indigenous origin) and for studies of harm done to the 
environment, which are then to be published. Following the promulgation of the Constitu-
tion, the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Renewable Resources 
(IBAMA), the environmental agency at the federal level, was created in 1989.57 In the 
same year the National Environmental Policy was updated.58 It now requires the prior li-
censing of projects that may have environmental impacts and procedures for assessing 
these impacts. 
                                                 
54 More information about National System for the Management of Water Resources may be found in 
Braga et al. (2008). 
55 Known as the “Water Law”, which also instituted the National Policy for Water Resources (PNRH). 
56 Law 6938/1981. 
57 Law 7735/1989. 
58 Law 7804/1989. 
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With respect to the construction of hydropower dams, Law 7804/1989 introduced the ob-
ligation of prior environmental licensing together with environmental impact assessments 
of projects that may have environmental impacts. Environmental licences are granted by 
the environmental agencies and bodies composing the National Environmental System (at 
federal, state and municipal levels). But even though IBAMA is required to issue these 
licences, it is also meant to consider technical assessments provided by municipal or state 
environmental agencies and by the Brazilian National Indian Foundation and the National 
Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage (IPHAN). As a rule, states are entitled to 
elaborate their own sets of environmental laws and norms but, without contravening this 
principle, the central administration may also establish general licensing norms through 
CONAMA, standardizing procedures at national level. 
As regards environmental licensing, the World Bank (2008) claims that “Brazil is one of 
the very few countries (if not the only one) to employ a three-stage process (Preliminary 
License, Installation License and Operating License), with separate procedures for grant-
ing licenses at all three stages” (Summary Report 2008, 19). The Preliminary Licence is 
issued by the licensing agency for the planning phase of a project’s implementation, modi-
fication or expansion. The Installation Licence then authorises the beginning of the con-
struction or installation of the project. Finally, the Operating Licence is required before 
project operation and may need to be renewed.  
In the case of projects expected to cause significant environmental harm, such as hydro-
power plants according to CONAMA,59 the granting of the Preliminary Licence depends 
on the approval of both the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the correspond-
ing Environmental Impact Report (RIMA, a summarised version of the EIA), which pre-
sent an environmental diagnosis for the influence area of the project, an analysis of envi-
ronmental impacts of the project and alternatives, a list of measures designed to mitigate 
negative impacts and an indication of survey and monitoring programmes.60 Investors are 
expected to bear the cost of environmental licensing, the most relevant components of 
which are environmental studies (EIA, RIMA, etc.), the arrangement of public hearings, 
the publication in the press of actions related to the licensing process, the implementation 
of the programmes for which the licences provide (mitigation measures) and environ-
mental compensation.61 
In this context, Fearnside (1989, 2001, 2002 and 2005) refers to the conflict of interests 
that was common when studies were undertaken in the Amazon region in the 1970s and 
the project proponent (Eletronorte) and its associated consulting firms, which financed the 
research and studies, selected the information that would not discredit their projects. As 
already stated, the EIA/RIMA of potential new projects are now also contracted out by the 
EPE, which, as a representative of the State, is required to be impartial. 
Prior to EIA/RIMA, terms of reference are usually proposed by the project proponent and 
must be approved by an environmental licensing agency, which also submits them to the 
                                                 
59 Resolutions CONAMA 01/86 and 11/86. 
60 Resolution CONAMA 237/97. 
61 The payment of this compensation is obligatory for projects deemed to be responsible for significant 
environmental impacts. It is allocated to the financing of conservation areas/units from the integral pro-
tection group which may also be created as a result of the licensing process. 
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National Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage and FUNAI for its appraisal.62 These 
terms of reference define the scope of investigations to be undertaken and set out other 
requirements concerning, for example, the qualifications of the technical team responsible 
for drafting the studies. Although there is no federal legislation obliging the environmental 
licensing agency to comply with the terms of reference, it normally does so. As regula-
tions on the environmental licensing process vary among the states, the enforcement of 
terms of reference also varies (MPF 2004). 
Brazilian legislation63 has also institutionalised a public participation mechanism as part of 
the environmental licensing process. Public hearings may be held whenever the environ-
mental agency or the body responsible for issuing the licences sees fit or when called for 
by a civil society entity, by the Ministério Público or by 50 or more individuals. This 
means that public hearings usually take place before the issue of the Preliminary Licence, 
since the complaints and concerns voiced by local communities usually lead to the inclu-
sion in the license of mitigation or compensatory measures to be taken by the project pro-
ponent, the penalty for failure to do so being the withdrawal of the environmental licence. 
However, as public hearings may be called for at any moment of the decision-making 
process, they may also be held before the terms of reference are approved by the environ-
mental agency. According to IBAMA,64 announcements of public hearings must be made 
on the radio and on banners and published in the official press and in major local or re-
gional newspapers. As the location must be easily accessed by the interested parties, more 
than one public hearing on a single project may be held. Even so, criticism continues to be 
levelled at the ineffectiveness of the local population’s participation due to a lack of in-
formation on the project plans and a lack of people with appropriate technical skills 
(Fearnside 2006). 
In 2008 the World Bank undertook a thorough and critical analysis of the environmental 
licensing process for the construction of hydropower plants, its main observations being: 
1. Most of the problems associated with environmental licensing in Brazil occur at the 
first stage of a three-step process owing to a lack of adequate planning at government 
level; a lack of clarity about which level of government (federal or state) has the legal 
authority to issue environmental licences; delays in issuing the terms of reference for 
the environmental impact assessments (EIAs) required by law; the poor quality of the 
EIAs submitted by project proponents; the subsequent uneven evaluation of the EIAs 
(by the government); the lack of a suitable dispute resolution system; the absence of 
comprehensive rules on social compensation for populations affected by hydropower 
projects; and the shortage of qualified social development specialists within the gov-
ernment’s federal environmental agency (World Bank 2008, (I) 9). 
2. The preparation of the terms and the subsequent analysis of the EIA/RIMA are not 
always carried out in a competent, interdisciplinary fashion or within a reasonable 
timeframe as a result of insufficient financial and human resources of licensing bodies 
considering Brazil’s growing need for energy (World Bank 2008, (I), 24–25). 
                                                 
62 According to I06022009, although the Ministério Público (MPF 2004) argues that these institutions and 
others (e.g. Cultural Foundation Palmares) should be more involved at this stage. 
63 Article 2 of Resolution CONAMA 09/87. 
64 Online: http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php, last accessed 15 August 2010. 
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3. “Public prosecutors (Ministério Público, the author) enjoy virtually unlimited auton-
omy in Brazil. This power has no parallel in any of the other countries examined in 
this study65 and plays an important role in the lack of predictability and timeliness of 
the environmental licensing process. This allows prosecutors to be involved in techni-
cal or administrative acts related to the environment, which would otherwise fall un-
der the mandate of the environmental agency” (World Bank 2008, (I) 10, author’s 
footnotes). 
4. “The licensing process offers few opportunities for dispute resolution. As a result, dis-
putes related to environmental licensing tend to proliferate and are rarely resolved. 
This has led to a widespread perception that excessive environmental regulation exists 
in Brazil. The absence of regular revisions to the environmental licensing rules has led 
to an increase in political and social disputes; these disputes have created serious 
complications and delays for infrastructure projects” (World Bank 2008, (I) 20). 
Hochstetler and Keck also address the role played by the licensing process as a participa-
tive arena in which opinions can be aired: 
“These proceedings are all the more weighty (…) since the licensing process remains 
open to public scrutiny (having being established at the height of democratizing ef-
forts during the transition), and therefore has become virtually the only setting that 
requires public debate about economic decisions, even state projects. As a result, in-
dividual licensing decisions often become crucibles for the airing of giant social con-
flicts that really should be settled in other ways, but are not (…) That environmental 
activists have had an institutionalized seat at the table for twenty years to discuss 
such conflicts, and citizens have been able to join these processes as well, mean that 
environmental decision-making is in fact considerably more open to public scrutiny in 
Brazil than in many countries, whatever the limitations and final decisions” 
(Hochstetler / Keck 2007, 45–46). 
This perception was also shared by some interviewees, who emphasised that the process is 
used to discuss energy planning options rather than the impacts of specific projects (indi-
cating that society is not using the discussion forums created at planning level).66 One pos-
sible reason for this may be that licensing processes attract more attention from society as 
a whole than the planning phase (since the consequences of a project may be perceived as 
more tangible than those of planning studies)67 and that this process, acting as a shop-
window, suits those interested in a broad ideological discourse in a sphere where the focus 
should be on technical data and information.68 
To conclude, while the environmental licensing process in Brazil has the strength of being 
highly participative and based on strong institutionalised norms and laws, among them 
several internationally recognised and recommended standards, its weakness lies in the 
lack of implementing capacities and resources of the licensing bodies (at federal and state 
levels). The considerable variation in subnational environmental policies and practices 
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(along with conflicting norms) is an inevitable consequence of federalism applied to the 
environmental sphere in a country marked by strong economic disparities among regions. 
The main steps in the overall decision-making on the construction of a hydropower plant 
within the current legal framework are shown in Figure 4. 






















Source: Own compilation 
3.2.2 Resettlement 
Resettlement policies and practices are discussed during the environmental licensing proc-
ess and form part of it. Discussions on resettlement are initiated through EIA/RIMA, 
which establishes the area that will be directly affected by the reservoir (comprising both 
flooded areas and areas that will be isolated by the reservoir)69, indicating the number of 
people who will be displaced and possible solutions.70 Once the Preliminary Licence has 
                                                 
69 I30012009. 












National Energy Plan 
Updates – 4 years  
Long-term / medium-term 
planning 
10-Year Plan 
annual updates  
Expansion monitoring 













tion to clear 
vegetation 
Rights to use water resources 
EIA/RIMA  
Integrated Environmental EvaluationEnergy  Project
Water Resources/Environment 
MME/EPE/ANEEL  
Terms of reference 











Sustainable dam development in Brazil: Between global norms and local practices 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 23 
been granted, the concessionaire must draw up the Basic Environmental Plan (PBA), in 
which it must give more details about the specific measures it intends to take.71 IBAMA 
encourages concessionaires to resolve conflicts and to begin implementing its resettlement 
and compensation programmes while Installation Licences are still valid and six months 
before the reservoir is filled.72 
The second observation concerns the reasoning behind this procedure: it is a characteristic 
of the Brazilian environmental culture that it addresses social and environmental problems 
together, since they exacerbate each other, a further aim of addressing environmental im-
pacts being to guarantee the various rights of communities whose livelihoods depend on 
the environment (as pointed out by Hochstetler / Keck, 2007, 109). This concept was offi-
cially adopted by the Ministry of Environment in 2003, when President Lula chose Marina 
Silva, a senator from the state of Acre and a symbolic leader of the rubber-tapper move-
ment,73 to be the head of the MMA.74 
Nevertheless, it must also be pointed out that Brazil does not have a specific set of laws 
and norms that address the subject of people having to be resettled because of infrastruc-
ture projects, including hydropower plants. Two possible arguments for this could be that 
the number of affected people may not be large enough to justify a specific set of norms75 
and that there are other laws and norms concerning similar problems that may also be ap-
propriate to resettlement (the Constitution, for example, guarantees property rights and 
expropriation rights).76 
The MME has the following to say about information on the number of affected people:  
“With respect to the affected population, there is a major difficulty in obtaining data; 
to plot the evolution of this figure, it was necessary to gather information about the 
contingent of people affected by hydropower plants with an installed capacity of 100 
MW or above between 1992 and 2002. During this period 17 hydropower plants with 
a total installed capacity of 15,647 MW, mainly concentrated in the southeastern, 
northeastern, mid-western and southern regions of Brazil, began operating, flooding 
an area of 6,990 km2 and affecting a population of 20,912 families (83,650 people). 
As to the decade 2005—2016 the forecast of the number of people affected by the hy-
dropower plants covered by the PDEE (10-Year Expansion Plan) is 73,300” (MME 
2007, 639).77  
However, as the new hydropower plants are being built in increasingly remote locations 
and as future hydropower plants will hardly flood areas on the same scale as hydropower 
projects in the past,78 because of the obvious environmental impacts, the number of people 
affected by an individual project may fall.  
                                                 
71 I30012009 and I13022009b. 
72 I30012009. 




77 Translated by the author. 
78 Current projects have been giving precedence to river flow turbines. 
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As for other sets of laws and norms relating to resettlement, while CF/88 guarantees prop-
erty rights, it also gives the State the right to expropriate private property in the public 
interest. Article 5(XXIV) called for future legislation79 to establish the procedures for ex-
propriation in cases of public need, social interest or public utility, with fair and previous 
pecuniary compensation. In the case of hydropower plants, expropriation occurs mainly 
when the use of the private asset concerned is considered to be advantageous, useful and 
of public utility. In the case of hydropower projects, ANEEL is entitled to issue a Declara-
tion of Public Utility (DUP) at the request of the concessionaire in order to effect the ex-
propriation of land or administrative easement (servidão administrativa) to permit the 
construction of a hydropower plant in the public interest. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional right to compensation for land expropriated to enable a 
hydropower plant to be constructed (and related laws and norms), social movements fre-
quently question these processes, since they address only those who can prove ownership 
of the land concerned rather than all those who live on and from that land. 
Some of these social movements, whose anti-capitalist80 approach is closely linked to de-
mands for agrarian reform, frequently oppose the construction of new dams, examples 
being the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – Landless Workers 
Movement), Via Campesina and MAB (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens – 
Movement of Dam-Affected People). The lack of information available to affected com-
munities and their lack of political engagement have led social movements to claim the 
right to act as intermediaries in negotiations for compensation between affected people 
and project developers, as they consider themselves to be specialists in the negotiation 
field.81 
Like the above mentioned movements and organisations, the MAB’s focus of operations 
has also responded to a changing context, as Rothman and Oliver point out: 
“In the early stages, the progressive church was the predominant influence and was 
largely responsible for framing the key issue as peasants’ right to land, while left in-
tellectuals contributed a class analytical frame. After 1988, the weakening of the 
Federal government regional power company ELETROSUL,82 the crisis of the Left af-
ter the fall of the Berlin Wall, the defeat of the agrarian reform movement, the rise of 
the international and national ecology movements, and the anti-dam movement’s 
need for a broader political and financial base all contributed to the adoption of a 
                                                 
79 Law 9785/1999, Provisional Measure 2183-56/2001, Law 11977/2009 updating Decree-Law 3365/1941, 
Law 2786/1956, Law 4686/1956, Decree-Law 856/1969, Law 6071/1974 and Laws 6306 and 6602/ 
1978. 
80 It is worth mentioning Hochstetler / Keck (2007) again, since they also address the environmental 
movement as the new left stronghold, with the left fighting for participation in the democratising transi-
tion and in environmental policies. But the leftist approach is not exclusive to environmental organisa-
tions, as is evident from Conselho Indigenista Missionário – Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) and 
from FASE, one of the oldest Brazilian NGOs focusing on social and educational assistance and on lo-
cal, associative and cooperative development aimed at “defeating neo-liberal policies” (online: 
http://www.fase.org.br/v2/pagina.php?id=10, accessed on 16 August 2010).  
81 I06022009, I12032009a. 
82 As a consequence of the privatisation of its generation assets in the 1990s and of new private hydro-
power projects in the region. 
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broadened and more pro-active land/energy/ecology frame and an alliance with in-
ternational environmentalism” (Rothman / Oliver 2002, 1, author’s footnote). 
What these movements have in common is the rural land struggle. However, their inclu-
sion of the environmental debate may be helping to sustain their land struggle, and their 
presence and genuine entitlement to land are advantageous to environmental and even 
preservationist organisations, which have incorporated the social facet of the issue in their 
discourse, thus legitimising their actions.  
On the general subject of the legitimacy of Brazilian NGOs, it is worth mentioning that 
they have all responded to changes in political opportunities: during the democratisation 
period and with the reinforcement of participative mechanisms and with NGOs acting in 
the 1990s as instruments of public policies at local level, which the State was unable to 
reach efficiently, NGOs were clearly recognised as representatives of society as a whole. 
But, as time passed and they became better organised, having established a wide network 
of allies, the presence of the same individuals in different organisations, networks, forums 
and councils83 and their ambiguous relationship with the State led to the NGOs’ represen-
tativeness and legitimacy being questioned, since they were faced with the same problem 
as the State: it became more difficult for them to keep in touch with the grass-roots 
movements while representing them in every instance. In other words, people who had 
their origins in grass-roots movements became – paradoxically – remote from them as 
their involvement in all the newly created participative bodies grew. 
This prompted the NGOs to change their support base: they do not seek to defend a cause 
as representatives of society, which would then legitimise their action. Their source of 
legitimacy is now the cause itself: the preservation of a certain species of fish or a certain 
biome or education in resettlement areas.84  
Possibly because of the legacy of the previous administration (more than 40 hydropower 
projects approved but not constructed) or again because of common origins in the democ-
ratisation period, the Workers’ Party administration began engaging in regular round table 
discussions with the MAB85 to address this movement’s claims and to set up an interminis-
terial working group (GTI) in October 2003 to analyse those claims and propose solutions 
to problems of people affected by dams. The GTI is recognised (Casa Civil da Presidência 
da República 2004) as the first attempt ever in the history of Brazil’s electricity industry to 
include this matter in the federal administration’s official agenda. The GTI’s report re-
ferred to the basic need to define who, in addition to the land-owners, is entitled to com-
pensation for the effects of resettlement programmes, thus demonstrating that in Brazil 
everyone living in the area and from its resources is considered to be affected by a dam. 
The absence of official criteria, on the other hand, makes it difficult to establish a starting 
point for social auditing procedures, since a growing number of dispossessed people are 
attracted to such areas in the hope of eventually benefiting from any resettlement, com-
pensation or social programme or even from recently created job opportunities. 
                                                 
83 This problem of over-representation was also addressed by I22042009. 
84 This reflection can be attributed to the discussions with I29042009. 
85 Installed in April 2004 (Casa Civil da Presidência da República 2004). 
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While there is clearly an absence of a specific set of norms relating exclusively to reset-
tlement, it is nevertheless possible to detect a change in the way this issue has been ad-
dressed since the adoption of CF/88 and more recently by President Lula’s administration. 
In this context, it is important to make it clear that the information on trends in this area of 
policy (and on associated instruments) was gleaned from the statements of the interview-
ees who collaborated in this study. They attributed the evolution of resettlement practices 
to several factors, such as a reaction to (and lessons learnt from) past experience,86 the 
process of democratisation,87 the role played since then by NGOs and social movements,88 
by the media89 and by the Ministério Público,90 and the reinforcement of environmental 
legislation and EIA/RIMA since CF/88,91 since these procedures are addressed during the 
environmental licensing process.  
The interviews revealed a wide range of instruments commonly used under resettlement 
policies to assist affected people and of goals pursued, although it was also said that con-
cessionaires preferred pecuniary compensation (usually in the form of letters of credit), 
which causes severe social damage (such as the loss of valued neighbourly relations) and 
is therefore discouraged by federal administrations and by the Ministério Público.92 While 
compensation is still paid in the form of letters of credit, concessionaires are also expected 
to offer the options of collective resettlement, individual plots of land and land in areas 
close to cities, as people or families affected choose.93 Although it has become common 
practice to celebrate agreements, concessionaires are not (and could not be) encouraged to 
negotiate with social movements: they are meant to deal directly with affected people, 
they being entitled to select (or not to select)a representative to engage in the negotiations. 
Social movements tend to feel neglected when negotiations take place between the con-
cessionaire and individual families or groups of people.94 
Living conditions in the resettlement areas are better than in the previous living areas,95 
since they have better infrastructure (access, public transport, sanitation, connection to the 
electricity grid, education and health care systems).96 If they are in rural regions (as they 
usually are), there must be access to technical assistance,97 since resettlement programmes 
must ensure not only the maintenance of livelihoods98 but also economic inclusion.99 Con-
sequently, concessionaires are also expected to offer income programmes and replacement 
                                                 
86 I12032009b. 
87 I30012009 and I25032009. 
88 I05122008, I30012009, I16012009, I13022009b and I25032009. 
89 I16012009 and I30012009. 
90 I05122008 and I30012009. 
91 I16012009. 
92 I06022009 and I04032009. 
93 I30012009 and I13022009b. 
94 I30012009, I06022009 and I12032009a. 
95 I12022009. 
96 I05122008, I16012009 and I26122008. 
97 I16012009. 
98 I06022009 and I12022009. 
99 I12032009b. 
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jobs.100 In the latter case, they are required to provide a temporary income until the new 
land starts producing101 and compensation for lost profits.102 The continuation of 
neighbourly relations should be ensured.103 
However, people who do not have property rights are also eligible to participate in reset-
tlement and compensation programmes.104 They include people with links to the affected 
area, such as employees, sharecroppers and tenants,105 who are known as “children of the 
land” (filhos da terra);106 and even those earning a temporary income from the work at the 
construction site (such as people selling snacks in the area) are eligible.107 The environ-
mental agency is, however, expected to set a minimum time for people to be considered 
bound to the land and so entitled to the benefits.108 
Even people whose income previously came from informal or illegal109 activities are eligi-
ble for resettlement and compensation. Two possible reasons were cited by the interview-
ees:110 these programmes are not intended to be discriminatory,111 but are designed to pro-
vide for social compensation rather than the mere disbursement of financial resources.112 It 
may be inferred that the administrations are adopting this lenient position because it is 
thought that these people had no choice before the dam but to engage in informal or illegal 
activities, a situation which should be changed with the economic resources created by the 
construction of the hydropower plant. 
The selection rules on the acquisition of new land require the concessionaire to offer the 
affected people more than one option to choose from.113 The land is to be close to the 
original location,114 have similar qualities,115 be productive, be reasonably flat,116 have 
good infrastructure and ensure easy access.117 How much compensation is paid depends on 
the value of the assets (comprising not only the land but also machinery and equipment)118 
and revenue lost.119 
                                                 
100 I05122008. 
101 I16012009 and I13022009b. 
102 I30012009 and I06022009. 
103 I12022009 and I13022009b. 





109 Like illegal mining or sand removal. 
110 I05122008, I12022009, I16012009, I30012009 and I06022009. 
111 I12022009. 
112 I05122008. 
113 I13022009b and I12032009b. 
114 I05122008, I16012009 and I26122008. 
115 I16012009 and I12032009b. 
116 I30012009. 
117 I16012009 and I30012009. 
118 I16012009, I12022009 and I13022009b. 
119 I16012009, I06022009 and I12022009. 
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As may have been noted, a wide range of instruments are available for negotiations be-
tween concessionaires and affected people, for the Basic Environmental Plan and for in-
clusion in environmental licenses as conditions or mitigation measures. In this regard, the 
renewal of licences and the issue of the next ones are considered to be opportunities for 
the environmental agency to perform its task of determining whether the agreed social 
compensation measures have been taken.120 The withdrawal of an environmental licence or 
its non-renewal is the penalty imposed on concessionaries if they fail to take the agreed 
measures.121 
Recent efforts to cope with the social aspects of dam construction are also recognised by 
the World Bank:  
“In discussions with government agencies we noted that the social problems associ-
ated with hydropower projects, which tended to outweigh the purely environmental 
issues, were duly recognized. Considerable interest was shown in seeking solutions. It 
should be mentioned that the many social demands arising during the licensing stages 
of hydropower developments are essentially social ones. Many of these are often un-
related to the project and generally precede the project itself. The burden of costs to 
satisfy these demands cannot be borne entirely by the project proponent. The Gov-
ernment could play a more effective role in the licensing process as a partner and 
meet demands of this type. Based on Conta 10,122 the present study has estimated that 
the costs involved in addressing the social issues linked to environmental licensing 
are of the order of US$ 94 per installed kW on average” (World Bank 2008, (I) 27, 
author’s footnote). 
From inventory data the World Bank concluded that the figure observed for social and 
physical environmental costs in relation to total plant costs (both measured in terms of 
installed kW) may be “estimated at an average of 12 percent. Outlays for social aspects, 
such as population resettlement, support to communities and municipalities and supplying 
infrastructures, represents the major part of these costs (about 80 percent), whereas the 
costs associated with the physical environment represent only 2 percent of the total cost” 
(World Bank 2008, 26). 
3.3 The role of the judiciary and the Ministério Público 
The role of the judiciary in dam construction has grown with the democratisation of the 
country, since the incorporation and development of a procedural mechanism for group 
litigation in 1985123 and with the creation of the public civil action (ação civil pública), 
which enables environmental, consumer and other “diffuse and collective”124 interests to 
be legally defended. The following institutions are entitled to bring public civil actions:125 
                                                 
120 I05122008 and I26122008. 
121 I12022009 and I13022009b. 
122 Conta 10 is a component of the budget structure used by the EPE and Eletrobras to estimate the cost of 
future hydropower plants. 
123 Law 7347. 
124 The inclusion of collective and diffuse interests as subjects of public civil actions is an achievement of 
the CF/88, which therefore increased the use of this instrument. See Lopes 2000. 
125 According to Law 7347, updated by Law 11448 of 2007. 
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the Public Prosecution Service (Ministério Público); the Public Defender’s Office (Defen-
soria Pública); the Union, states, Federal District and Municipalities; autarquia,126 state-
owned companies, foundations and semi-public companies (sociedades de economia 
mista); and any association which has been in existence for at least one year and has as 
one of its specific aims the protection of the environment, consumers, the economic order, 
free competition or national treasures of artistic, aesthetic, historic, touristic or landscape 
value. 
The Ministério Público is the State institution responsible for ensuring the enforcement of 
legislation. Where legislation is infringed, the Ministério Público is required to insist 
(usually through the judiciary) on the State organs and institutions concerned complying 
with the law (Lopes 2000). The Ministério Público is frequently referred to as the fourth 
branch of the Brazilian State because, although legally bound to the executive, it is not 
legally subordinated to it. As its task is to ensure that public agents respect the law, the 
members of the Ministério Público are entitled to functional independence, which also 
means that each prosecutor (procurador) is able to bring legal actions. The structure of the 
Ministério Público conforms to the distinction made by Brazilian federalism between the 
Union and the states.  
With respect to the shared right to bring public civil actions mentioned above, even though 
associations of organised civil society do not need the intervention of the Ministério 
Público, they choose in most cases to address their claims to the Ministério Público’s 
prosecutors, who then file the public civil actions concerning their claims (Lopes 2000 and 
I04032009). One of the reasons for this approach may be that, of all the players involved 
in the environmental licensing process, the Ministério Público has the best educated staff, 
significant resources and a broad mandate (World Bank 2008; Lopes 2000; and 
I04032009). 
The Ministério Público does not need to be called upon by other agents to act. Prosecutors 
may bring a public civil action based on a newspaper article, for example.127 In this respect 
its relationship with civil society is qualified in two ways: it is open to demands from civil 
society, thus constituting an agency that vocalises socially relevant issues as well as giving 
them political relevance; and it frequently induces demands, favouring specific societal 
dynamics. The Ministério Público is thus an institution whose activities reduce the cost of 
organising the process of bringing social concerns to the attention of the public sphere and 
of society in general (Lopes 2000). 
Despite the relevance of its role of vocalising social demands and giving them political 
importance and of acting as an external monitor128 of public decisions and policies, the 
Ministério Público is frequently criticised for the action it takes, especially in the case of 
the environmental licensing of hydropower projects. Considering the delays they cause in 
the licensing process, the World Bank (2008) claims that licensing agency employees fear 
penalties which may be imposed on them by the Ministério Público under the Environ-
                                                 
126 ANEEL and ANA, for example. 
127 I04032009. 
128 Also recognised by I05122008, I16012009, I30012009 and I13022009b. 
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mental Crimes Act129 and the Administrative Improbity Act,130 which hold officials per-
sonally and criminally liable even when they act in good faith in complex circumstances. 
They therefore keep raising new demands concerning the scope of EIA as a means of de-
ferring the need to take a decision (whether or not to issue the environmental licence). 
Many interviewees confirmed this perception, and the press has sometimes referred to 
cases where officials have been sued131 or intimidated132 by the Ministério Público. 
Hochstetler / Keck (2007, 45) also refer to the judiciary and to the Ministério Público spe-
cifically in the context of the environmental licensing process: 
“In any case, licensing conflicts have increasingly moved to a new battle field, the 
courts – again, at all levels of government. While business has always exercised this 
option, the Ministério Público is now a frequent ‘judicializer’ of the licensing proc-
ess, using the courts to insist on environmental impact assessments that have been 
omitted, or questioning the quality of completed ones.” 
As regards the reasons for so many actions concerning dams being brought, it was claimed 
that the quality of studies or the mitigation of a certain impact is questioned because Bra-
zil’s laws and its Constitution contain many “imprecise legal concepts,”133 which usually 
call for the drafting of further normative legislation. As a result, the judiciary is asked to 
“legislate” by interpreting vague norms.134 
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the Ministério Público not only acts through 
litigation (mainly public civil or penal actions),135 but also organises public hearings (like 
the one held to discuss the PDEE 2009), makes recommendations to public organs or insti-
tutions (which are subject to penalties in the case of non-compliance) and intervenes in 
such negotiated agreements as the Protocol for Adjustment of Public Conduct (TAC), 
governed by Law 7347/1985.136 In the TAC the public sector commits itself to implement-
ing procedures necessary to bring about appropriate and regular activities designed to pre-
vent or repair environmental damage as a means of respecting collective, diffuse or indi-
vidual homogeneous rights. The TAC may be signed with an agent under civil investiga-
tion or involved in a public civil action (in which case, the investigation or action is termi-
nated), thus necessitating the agreement of the Ministério Público and/or environmental 
agencies of the National Environmental System, the payment of damages, the total clarifi-
cation of the facts and the imposition of penalties in the event of non-compliance with the 
negotiated terms of the TAC. According to the World Bank (2008), the TAC is frequently 
used as an instrument of conflict management, helping to reduce delays in the process 
(since the judicial alternative usually takes longer). Despite the benefits of this agreed so-
lution, the World Bank also points out that the TAC may be used with a “deviation of pur-
                                                 
129 Law 9605/98. 
130 Law 8429/92  
131 Canal Energia (2009). 
132 Sales (2009). 
133 I13032009, the expression “equilibrated ecosystems” being an example. 
134 I30012009. 
135 Article 8 of Complementary Law 75 of 20 May 1993 establishes specific procedures that the Ministério 
Público may follow to fulfill its responsibilities and competencies. 
136 I04032009. 
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pose” (desvio de finalidade), when agreed compensatory measures do not correlate with 
the identified environmental damage. 
In conclusion, it can be accepted that Brazil has institutionalised norms on global envi-
ronment, human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights. As Khagram (2004, 159) points 
out, these norms have contributed to organisation and mobilisation at both international 
and domestic level and were critical of the transformation of large dam projects and de-
velopment in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Khagram, while “(…)100 
big dams were built during the 1950s and 103 during the 1960s, this rate dramatically 
dropped to 91 in the 1970s, 60 in the 1980s, and to less than 30 in the 1990s” (Khagram 
2004, 142). 
4 Case studies 
Now that the current regulatory framework, the agents and networks involved in the proc-
ess and the structural and policy changes in recent decades have been presented, this chap-
ter will analyse individual dam projects where these changes can be observed (see table 1).  
4.1 Dam building during the military dictatorial regime and the newly 
implemented democracy (1974–1988) 
The best known projects built during this period, with the exception of the binational UHE 
Itaipu on Brazil’s southern border with Paraguay, were undertaken in the northern and 
northeastern regions of the country. Two of the many projects are presented: a hydropower 
plant built in the northern state of Amazonas, the UHE Balbina, known for its environ-
mental impacts, and a plant built in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, the UHE 
Itaparica, known for its controversial and expensive resettlement experience. 
Balbina hydropower plant 
The UHE Balbina (250 MW) is known as the worst project built in Brazil in terms of envi-
ronmental damage, because it resulted in the flooding of 2,360 km2 of dense tropical forest 
in the Brazilian Amazon region. 
In 1977, Presidential Decree 79321 granted state-owned Eletronorte (the subsidiary of 
Eletrobras in the region) a concession to exploit the hydraulic energy potential of the River 
Uatumã at a location known as Cachoeira Balbina. Balbina was built to supply electricity 
to Manaus, a city whose electricity demand grew sharply while the dam was under con-
struction, outstripping its supply capacity, because of delays in the construction schedule: 
contracts were signed in 1981, the filling of the reservoir began in 1987, and the first gen-
erating unit went into operation in 1989 (the fifth and last one followed in 1990). 
The delays were due to a lack of resources delaying the design of the basic project (1977 
and 1978); Eletronorte’s suspension of its activities (for eighteen months) to study the 
alternative of supplying the Manaus market with a thermal plant fuelled with mineral coal 
from the state of Santa Catarina (an alternative that proved to be uneconomical); and 
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Table 1: The dam projects investigated at a glance 
Historical  
moment 
Military dictatorial regime  Liberalising period of 
the ESI 




Itaparica Balbina  Cana Brava Santo Antônio 
Region Nordeste Norte Centro-Oeste Norte 
State Pernambuco Amazonas Goiás Rondônia 
River São Francisco Uatumã Tocantis Madeira 
Year of the 
concession 
contract 
1945 N.A. 1998 2008 
Equity holders Chesf Eletronorte Tractebel Energia Furnas, Odebrecht, 
Andrade Gutierrez, 
Cemig e Investment 
Fund 
Origin public public private public and private 
Planning  
studies 
Enenorde, Plano 90 Eneram, Plano 
2010 
10-Year Energy Plan Eneram 
Year of the 
study 
1973 1972 early 1990s 1973 
Beginning of 
construction 
1979 1981 1998 2008 
Operation  
(1st turbine) 
1988 1989 2002 2012 
Installed ca-
pacity (MW) 
1480 250 450 3150 
Reservoir area 
(km2) 
828 2360 139 271 
Reservoir 
volume (hm3) 




305 51.17 333** 70 
Total  
investment 
US$ 1622 million US$ 1033  
million*** 








Siemens Alstom Hydro, 
Bardella, Areva, Sie-

















Bank, other financial 
institutions 
BNDES, Santander, 
Banco do Brasil, Banco 
do Espírito Santo, 
Banco do Nordeste, 
Banco da Amazônia, 
Itaú BBA e Caixa 
Econômica Federal 
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357 (incl. 107 
indigenous  
persons) 
258 non-Indian  
families 











EIA/RIMA, one public 
hearing before the 
renewal of the LP 
ToR, EIA/RIMA, Stra-
tegic Environmental 
Evaluation, four public 
hearings, 64 participa-
tive meetings  
Licensing bod-
ies: licences 
IBAMA: LO CODEMA 
(Amazonas state): 
LI and LO  
FEMAGO (Goias 
state): LP, LI, LO 
IBAMA: LP, LI 
* above sea level 
** normal maximum level 
*** excluding interest 
**** resettled population (negotia-
tions with affected population 
is still in progress) 
 
ToR: Term of Reference 
LI: Installation Licence 
LO: Operation Licence 
LP : Preliminary Licence 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
budgetary constraints in 1983, 1984 and 1989, which caused a delay of a further two and a 
half years. These constraints added to inflation and exchange rate problems from 1975 to 
1988 and to the addition of further service costs (Eletrobras 1997, 30–34), resulted in a 
final cost of US$ 1,032 billion.137 The project relied on several sources of funding: foreign 
resources lent by Eletrobras, suppliers’ credit (from Banque Française du Commerce Ex-
térieur and from the French Treasury) and the Bank of Amazonia (BASA, with resources 
from BNDES/Finame). 
According to Fearnside, “[t]he World Bank was approached for funding Balbina, but re-
fused on environmental grounds. Subsequently Brazil obtained a sector loan to supply 
imported equipment for increasing electric power generation capacity throughout the 
country, thereby circumventing the bank’s environmental review of individual projects” 
(Fearnside 1989, 417). 
Although impacts of the project on the environment138 due to the rush to fill the reservoir 
without prior logging of the timber (Fearnside 1989; Eletrobras 1997) are undeniable, they 
do not invalidate the fact that the decision had been carefully planned by the Committee of 
                                                 
137 Values updated as of July 1988, excluding interest (Eletrobras 1997, 451).  
138 The impacts most frequently addressed are the loss of invaluable ecosystems, emissions of greenhouse 
gases at controversial levels and the deterioration of the quality of the water downstream from the dam 
because of the flooding of more than 2,000 km2 of dense tropical forests, which affected downstream 
riverside communities and killed fish. 
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Power Studies of the Amazon Region (Eneram),139 which considered the impacts before 
construction began.  
Environmental studies on Balbina were not needed because construction began before the 
regulation requiring such studies entered into force. However, an Operation Licence did 
need to be obtained for the dam from the environmental agency of the state of Amazonas 
(CODEMA), which called for a diagnostic report describing the features of the area before 
the reservoir was filled and detailing the environmental activities undertaken. Various fed-
eral, state and foreign institutions were involved, including universities and research bod-
ies, examples being IBAMA, FUNAI, the Amazonian National Research Institute (INPA), 
the Tropical Medicine Institute of Manaus (IMTM), the Amazonian Institute of Historical 
and Artistic Heritage and the Smithsonian Institution. Fearnside (1989) is critical of these 
studies on the grounds that they were contracted by Eletronorte, which had to approve the 
publication of research findings under the terms of the funding contract for these studies. 
He argues that they were mainly used for public relations purposes. 
Resettlement, on the other hand, was not such an important issue, since the remote area 
was almost unpopulated. Eletronorte offered land in government settlement projects to the 
250 non-indigenous residents of the Balbina submergence area and compensation (such as 
wells and solar dryers) to those living downstream from the dam (Fearnside 1989; Eletro-
bras 1997). The Balbina reservoir flooded two villages inhabited by 107 Waimiri-Atroari, 
who were resettled in two new villages. Eletronorte paid compensation to all the Waimiri-
Atroari at the value of their farmland. They were also reimbursed for the costs associated 
with the development of new farmland and the building of new villages. Eletronorte also 
provided financial assistance for the displacement and the building of two new support 
stations, replacing those previously sited in the reservoir area. The company signed an 
Agreement Protocol with FUNAI, taking over the responsibility to finance the delimita-
tion of Waimiri-Atroari land under Decree 97837 of June 1989, which allotted them an 
area of 2,585,911 ha within a 982.33 km perimeter comprising fourteen villages. In June 
1988, an additional compromise was added to the Agreement Protocol signed with FU-
NAI: financing would continue for the next 25 years and the Waimiri-Atroari Programme 
would be implemented (Eletrobras 1997, 484–485). The background of these activities is 
that between 1974 and 1987, the number of Waimiri-Atroari had come down from 1,500 
to 374 due to sickness and interference of Eletronorte and a mining company in their 
land.140 
The historical context may be considered fundamental in any explanation of the inferior 
decision-making process: environmental awareness was not developed and participation 
was not encouraged (and was even condemned) by an authoritarian military regime. The 
project was, moreover, located in a remote area with the goal of supplying electricity to a 
small and geographically isolated state capital. It was not a project of “national” interest 
and visibility as those of recent years, which supply electricity to the whole country; but a 
project in a remote area built to supply a local community.  
                                                 
139 The Committee was set up in May 1969. It reviewed available data and information on possible hydro-
power potential in the Amazon region, followed by systematic field investigation to identify, at an in-
ventory study level, sites for hydropower plants to supply the major development nuclei in the region, 
which were mainly the state capitals. 
140 See: http://www.waimiriatroari.org.br (20.10.2010). 
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Itaparica hydropower plant 
The construction of the UHE Itaparica,141 on the River São Francisco in the northeastern 
state of Pernambuco was a different experience. Its extensive reservoir affected several 
municipalities in the densely populated São Francisco valley. As many people were dis-
placed, the resettlement programme became a challenge for the military regime. 
The UHE Itaparica was planned to increase electricity supply in the northeast (Salomão 
2007), since links to other systems were poor and the strategy was to develop hydropower 
projects at a time of high oil prices. It would help to regularise the flows of water to the 
Paulo Afonso hydropower plants located on the river downstream. The 1,480 MW hydro-
power plant was built by Chesf, another subsidiary of Eletrobras, and was financed by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (of the World Bank group) and 
by Eletrobras. Its construction began in July 1979 and, with much the same delay as that 
experienced at the UHE Balbina, it went into operation only in June 1988. 
The Itaparica dam has a reservoir area of 828 km2,142 having flooded three municipalities 
in the state of Bahia (Chorrochó, Rodelas and Glória) and four in the state of Pernambuco 
(Belém do São Francisco, Floresta, Petrolândia and Itacuruba) and displaced some 7,000 
families (about 40,000 persons), including 200 families of Tuxá Indians (about 1,200 peo-
ple) (Salomão 2007). 
The news of the construction of a new dam in the densely populated region of Itaparica 
was spread by people contracted by Chesf to pave the way for the project and to identify 
all those to be resettled and by pólo sindical (an organisation representing different mu-
nicipal rural workers’ unions) (Scott 2006). The need to organise was a response to previ-
ous experience of resettlement in the area of the UHE Sobradinho (Lima 2007; Scott 
2006). Pólo sindical was conversant with documents guiding the actions of the State and 
was well advised by people and institutions with experience of defending the rights of 
excluded people. The strength of pólo sindical and of other workers’ unions during the 
negotiations with Chesf since 1986 is confirmed by Scott (2006), the entire resettlement 
process being a result of an agreement signed in 1986 between Chesf and the affected 
people, represented by pólo sindical. 
Like the UHE Sobradinho resettlement programme and as the population of the UHE 
Itaparica area lived mainly from subsistence agriculture (Lima 2007), the resettlement 
programme for the UHE Itaparica focused on rural resettlement and on keeping the reset-
tled people working in agriculture (Scott 2006). This was Chesf’s response to the affected 
people’s motto “Land for Land”.  
Lima (2007) argues that the São Francisco Valley Development Company, responsible for 
irrigation systems and technical assistance, and Chesf designed a self-management model 
entirely new to the resettled people, who were used to traditional agriculture. In other 
words, although instruments and technical assistance were generally available, the people 
did not know how to operate irrigation systems, leaving them feeling strange, vulnerable 
                                                 
141 Its name changed to UHE Luiz Gonzaga, as a tribute to a regional and renowned musician. 
142 See http://www.chesf.gov.br/portal/page/portal/chesf_portal/paginas/sistema_chesf/sistema_chesf_gerac 
ao/conteiner_geracao?p_name=_Luiz_Gonzaga, accessed on 18 August 2010. 
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and incapable and having to relearn cultivation methods. Besides this, the use of agro-
chemicals and pesticides, common in modern farming at that time, caused new health 
problems (Scott 2006). The different completion times of the irrigation systems and the 
agro-villages gave rise to new social and economic differences among resettled families 
(Lima 2007).  
With the construction of the villages and the resettlement programme delayed and indeed 
paralysed, Chesf created an additional mechanism to give the resettled families an income 
until they started producing on their own: the Temporary Maintenance Allowance (VMT). 
They are still receiving the VMT, since the construction of the agro-villages was not com-
pleted on the ground that they would not be economically viable. As a result, many reset-
tled families are entirely dependent on Chesf (some families have benefited from such 
alternative income as pensions and wages), having failed to reestablish their farming ac-
tivities (Lima 2007). Chesf, on the other hand, has not offered them the opportunity of 
developing any other economic activity in which the VMT could be invested to guarantee 
the continuation of their social position as workers (Scott 2006; World Bank 1998).  
The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group described the programme as a “costly 
misadventure”: the cost of the programme presents a ratio of resettlement costs to dam 
and power plant costs of almost 1:1. It concluded that “the outcome would have been less 
likely if the Bank and CHESF had designed an effective compensation package,” since 
“few of the resettled families were technically qualified or experienced commercial farm-
ers,” the handling of the VMT being the most delicate issue within the overall solution 
because it “(…) has been converted from a short-term palliative into a permanent compo-
nent of families’ household economies” (World Bank 1998, 1–3). 
Given the outcomes of the various resettlement programmes, Lima (2007) believes that 
the UHE Itaparica programme represented an advance in qualitative terms mainly as a 
result of social mobilisation by the workers’ unions, which succeeded in obtaining com-
pensation, a resettlement programme and VMTs for the resettled population. “Polo sindi-
cal’s remarkably professional performance as a leader of an unorganised peasantry” was 
also highlighted by the World Bank (1998). Another recognised gain was the access to 
land granted to all farmers: landowners, employees, sharecroppers and tenants. Landown-
ers were also entitled to compensation for flooded and lost assets. Lima accepts that the 
construction of the hydropower project created employment opportunities, that the new 
city has better infrastructure and access to public services and that there are now more 
dynamic commercial and farming activities. But he also emphasises that this development 
was not accomplished without affecting lives formerly based on friendship, neighbour-
hood and family ties, even if the planned resettlement had provided for the preservation of 
some community ties. Scott (2006), on the other hand, refers to the continuing dependence 
of resettled people on Chesf and its VMT, recalling that, before the dam, there had been 
almost no unemployment in the region and that, after the dam, these workers lost their 
production basis. 
As regards the resettlement of the Tuxá, Salomão (2007) claims that the Ministério 
Público played an important role in defending their rights. In 1991, after FUNAI had de-
nounced Chesf for failing to comply with targets and deadlines set in an agreement signed 
in 1987, the Ministério Público ensured that Chesf signed a new agreement in 1994, the 
first to involve the Tuxá community directly. In 2001, the Ministério Público also suc-
Sustainable dam development in Brazil: Between global norms and local practices 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 37 
ceeded in granting new Tuxá families the right to the VMT. In 2006 it organised a meeting 
with the three Tuxá communities (Rodelas, Ibotirama and Inanjá) and Chesf, with the aim 
of ordering Chesf to allocate R$ 1.4 billion to Tuxá resettlement for the acquisition of 
land, for the introduction of irrigation systems and for their operation, maintenance and 
any technical assistance needed. By the end of the negotiations it had been decided that the 
irrigation system project should not be implemented and that the amount set aside for it 
should be shared among all 442 Tuxá families, who would receive approximately R$ 
110,000 each. This sum would be paid by Chesf in three (annual) instalments and the 
payment of the VMT would not be suspended until two years after the payment of the last 
instalment. Salomão (2007) concludes by recognising that, although these communities 
may be living in wealthier conditions since the construction of the dam, they miss several 
aspects of their former lives. 
The case of the UHE Itaparica illustrates that even in an authoritarian political regime re-
settlement was considered. Also worthy of note is that resettlement is a continuous process 
which the project developer adjusts as time passes and circumstances change. It is not a 
watertight solution. On the other hand, projects like the UHE Itaparica that were affected 
by changing institutional frameworks, unfavourable macroeconomic policies and budget-
ary constraints are subject to various contingencies, for which no provision was made in 
this case, resulting in delays and failure to take planned and agreed measures. Conse-
quently, as social liabilities become evident and as the public questioning of the compa-
nies’ failure to comply with commitments becomes unavoidable and is even backed by the 
Ministério Público, companies have to allocate considerable economic and technical re-
sources to deal with plans that have not been implemented.  
4.2 Dam-building in a newly liberalised industry (1995–2001)143 
Cana Brava hydropower plant 
Before the case of the UHE Cana Brava built on the River Tocantins during the liberalisa-
tion of the Brazilian ESI is presented, it is worth mentioning that its planning and part of 
its environmental licensing were undertaken prior to 1995. 
The UHE Cana Brava is a 450 MW project located some 50 km downstream from the 
UHE Serra da Mesa reservoir,144 on the border between the municipalities of Minaçu and 
Cavalcante, in the state of Goias, and flooded an area of 138.7 km2. The project was origi-
nally to be undertaken by Furnas, a subsidiary of Eletrobras, which carried out the pre-
liminary studies, including the EIA study submitted to the Goias environmental agency 
(FEMAGO at that time) in 1987. In 1990 FEMAGO issued the Preliminary Licence to 
Furnas once the EIA study and the RIMA had been approved. The Preliminary Licence 
                                                 
143 This section is based on da Costa / Correia (2008). 
144 A hydropower plant with a nominal capacity of 1,275 MW, its dam designed to be Brazil’s major artifi-
cial freshwater dam, having a 54 billion cubic meters storage capacity and an area of 1,780 km2. The 
UHE Serra da Mesa became operational in 1998, 12 years after its construction began. 
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was subsequently renewed in 1995 and again in October 1997 after a public hearing had 
been held in Minaçu on 23 April 1997 (IADB 2000a).145  
Following an international tendering procedure that closed on 19 March 1998, a 35-year 
concession contract was awarded by ANEEL to the Companhia Energética Meridional 
(CEM) in accordance with the previous regulatory model for the ESI. The CEM was a 
special-purpose company created to undertake the project and owned by Tractebel Energia 
S.A., a subsidiary of Tractebel S.A. of Belgium, one of the largest independent power 
producers in the world. As the IADB pointed out in 2000 (IADB 2000 b), Cana Brava was 
one of the first private projects to be developed within Brazil’s new institutional and regu-
latory framework for the power sector, which was introduced in 1995. Cana Brava was the 
first project-financed independent power producer. In addition to loans from BNDES, the 
CEM received US$ 160 million in IADB financing, including a US$ 75 million loan from 
ordinary capital and a US$ 85.2 million syndicated loan from funds provided by financial 
institutions that underwrote participation agreements with the IADB (IADB 2004).  
The CEM’s application to FEMAGO for an Installation Licence included updated envi-
ronmental and social information and data on the basic project. The Installation Licence 
was then granted by FEMAGO in September 1998. The CEM’s construction work was 
concluded in December 2001, the filling of the reservoir began in January 2002, and the 
plant went into operation shortly afterwards. 
In accordance with its own environmental and social policies, the IADB issued its “Envi-
ronmental and Social Impact Report” (IADB 2000a), the key points of which are as fol-
lows: 
The total cost of the project was estimated at US$ 426 million. The cost of environmental 
and social mitigation during construction and operation was estimated at approximately 
US$ 25.5 million. This amount included the total cost of the Environmental and Social 
Mitigation Programme (ESMP) for both the construction and the operation phases, includ-
ing the specific environmental management measures for the campsite, the rehabilitation 
of degraded areas and the expropriation and resettlement costs (item 2.16 of the report). 
The ESMP for the Cana Brava plant consisted of 19 mitigation and monitoring pro-
grammes that accounted for a total of approximately US$ 20 million (item 6.31 of the re-
port). 
A formal census of families/persons directly affected by the flooding of the area was taken 
from March to September 1999. On 29 November 1999 the census was formally validated 
at a public meeting, at which some 300 people from the affected area were present, includ-
ing the mayors of Minaçu and Cavalcante and representatives of the Ministério Público 
(item 3.23 of the report).  
                                                 
145 It is worth mentioning that the public hearing took place after the granting of the Preliminary License, 
but as a requirement for its renewal, i.e. before any environmental harm could have been done (which 
would have occurred after the granting of the Installation License). There is no information why no pub-
lic hearing was held before the Preliminary License was granted, although it may be assumed that the 
prospect of the project really being built by a state-owned company with no investment capacity at that 
time was questionable. The renewal application shortly before the closing date for private investors to 
submit tenders may indicate that the construction of the dam was considered a definite possibility. 
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According to item 5.8 of the report, a total of 258 families were then to be moved from the 
reservoir area and receive compensation and/or be resettled under a Compensation and 
Resettlement Plan (at the time the IADB issued its report, it mentioned only the draft ver-
sion of this resettlement plan). Item 4.25 of the report stated that there were no indigenous 
people in the Direct Area of Influence of Cana Brava. The draft Resettlement Plan con-
tained an estimated total cost, which included around US$ 4.1 million for land acquisition 
and about US$ 1.75 million for the resettlement programme (item 6.31 of the report). 
Although mitigation and resettlement measures were taken, persons affected by the con-
struction of Cana Brava power plant who were represented by the Movement of Dam-
Affected People (MAB) claimed that the demands of the local population had not been 
fully met by the project resettlement programmes already implemented. The IADB con-
ducted an audit to identify these demands and also to address social and economic devel-
opment problems in the project area not directly related to the Cana Brava hydroelectric 
project. The social audit initiated by the IADB in April 2003 consisted of an intensive 
five-month field investigation, a detailed review of compensation and resettlement claims 
and the identification of appropriate solutions. The audit was conducted with the participa-
tion of the MAB and several Brazilian government agencies and was undertaken to guar-
antee the inclusion of all the people affected by the project. The social audit recommended 
the resettlement of an additional 31 persons, potential adjustments to the compensation 
already paid to 62 persons and the payment of compensation to an additional 30 persons 
(IADB 2004)146. 
The IADB also undertook an Independent Investigation Mechanism review of Cana Brava 
in 2003, again at the MAB’s request.147 In its final report in July 2005 the Independent 
Panel found that the Bank had complied with many of its operational policies, but it also 
that it had failed to comply fully with its Operational Policy OP-710 on involuntary reset-
tlement. The management did not agree with the Panel’s conclusions and contended that 
the Bank had complied with all its policies. At a board meeting executive directors were 
unable to agree whether the specific policy concerned had been violated. But they did note 
that the area of the project had suffered from economic and social disadvantages before 
the initiation of the project (IADB 2006b) 
It is, however, important to mention that the Panel put forward recommendations address-
ing inter alia additional social and environmental unit staffing, resettlement planning and 
sufficiently early resettlement component screening. In this context “[t]he Board wel-
comed the commitment of IADB management (…) to establish an economic and social 
development fund to address broader economic and social issues in the Cana Brava pro-
ject area” (IADB 2006a).  
As a consequence, the Regional Development Fund for the Hydroelectric Power Plants of 
Cana Brava and Serra da Mesa148 was created in June 2007149 with the signing of a techni-
                                                 
146 Another result of this audit was the creation of a development fund to address development problems in 
the region. This is considered in the following paragraphs. 
147 According to the IADB (2006c), the request it received for an investigation of the Cana Brava project 
was presented in two letters dated 10 May 2002 and 9 July 2002 by a group of individuals claiming to 
have been affected by Cana Brava and represented by the MAB. 
148 As the two projects impacted the same population and region. 
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cal and financial cooperation agreement by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the 
partner companies CPFL Geração de Energia S.A. (co-owner of the Serra da Mesa plant), 
Furnas (co-owner of the Serra da Mesa plant) and Tractebel Energia S.A. (owner of the 
Cana Brava plant), and the Brazilian Service of Support for Micro and Small Enterprises 
of the state of Goias ( SEBRAE/GO).150 SEBRAE was appointed the executive body of the 
fund after signing an agreement with the IADB. It is important to mention that the techni-
cal and financial cooperation agreement signed by all these entities was also signed by 
representatives of the MAB as a witness. In other words, the conception of the fund relied 
on the participation of the main stakeholders involved in the construction of the dams and 
its consequences: the local population, government, private and public investors and fi-
nanciers. 
The aim of the fund is to promote economic opportunities for micro and small local rural 
enterprises and other forms of cooperative associations, involving not only formal social 
nuclei.151. Its resources are therefore to be allocated under a programme known as “Promo-
tion of Social Entrepreneurial Responsibility through the Support of Local Productive Ini-
tiatives in the State of Goias,” which is to be promoted by SEBRAE in nine municipalities 
near the two reservoirs in the state of Goias. The fund may therefore be seen as an attempt 
to address the “social liabilities” of the region and not only people directly affected by the 
projects.  
The UHE Cana Brava and the consequent regional development fund illustrate the con-
stant efforts made in Brazil to deal with social liabilities related to dams. In this case, 
however, the social debt has not been treated in a rather paternalistic approach (common 
in the past, as demonstrated by the UHE Itaparica, where the resettled people still depend 
on allowances paid by Chesf), but in a way that leads these affected people to develop 
ownership of the solutions to their problems. This may also be considered to be an evolu-
tion in the way resettlement issues are addressed, moving from a land for land form of 
compensation towards a solution based on the restoration or creation of livelihoods. And 
this innovative approach to this type of social liability may be partially attributed to the 
influence and expertise of a multilateral institution such as the IADB and to the growing 
attention paid by public authorities to social demands, be it through social mobilisation or 
through the Ministério Público.  
In this specific case, the Ministério Público (MPF 2007) petitioned the courts in Goias for 
a public civil action against Tractebel, CEM, IBAMA, the state environmental agency152 
and ANEEL. It claimed that environmental damage had been done because vegetation had 
not been suppressed in the reservoir area, and therefore called on the project developer to 
undertake mitigation measures to guarantee the quality of the water resources. The Min-
                                                                                                                                                   
149 Ministerial Order: Portaria MME nº 133 of 21 June 2007. 
150 SEBRAE was set up in 1972 as a private entity of public interest and has as its main source of revenue 
contributions collected from enterprises and as its main goal the encouragement of entrepreneurship in 
Brazil. It has offices throughout the country: the system is decentralised and composed of units distrib-
uted in the 27 states and in the Federal District. National SEBRAE has an office in Brasilia 
(www.sebrae.com.br).  
151 This is supported by the conclusions drawn by the IADB’s Panel from the social audit of the Cana Brava 
project, concerning the inadequate coverage of eligible individuals, with particular emphasis on informal 
goldminers. 
152 Its name changed from FEMAGO to AGEMA. 
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istério Público also sought to transfer the environmental licensing process153 from the state 
agency to IBAMA because of the regional impacts of the project and the impacts on the 
land of the Avá-Canoeiro, who should also be further compensated by the project devel-
oper.  
4.3 Dam-building in a newly regulated environment (from 2003) 
Santo Antônio hydropower plant 
The last case to be analysed is the 3,150 MW UHE Santo Antônio hydropower plant, the 
decision to construct was made after President Lula took office. The act marking this fact 
was the publication of Resolution 4 of the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) on 
28 September 2007. This resolution categorised the UHE Santo Antônio as an electricity 
generation project154 which was to be regarded as a priority when it came to granting a 
concession after a public tendering procedure because of its strategic importance and pub-
lic interest. 
The planning of this project began in the 1970s with the studies of the hydropower poten-
tial of the Amazon region, Eneram, which identified the River Madeira as a possible site 
for hydropower projects (Switkes 2001). The Madeira is a transboundary river which is 
formed by a wide network of smaller rivers that flow through Brazilian, Bolivian and Pe-
ruvian territory (such as the Rivers Beni, Mamoré, Guaporé, Madre de Dios and Orthon) 
and eventually flow into the River Amazon (Leme 2005a). But it was only in 2001, in the 
middle of the liberalisation period of the Brazilian ESI’s recent reforms, that Furnas and 
Odebrecht, a construction company, decided to undertake a joint study of the River Ma-
deira’s hydropower potential. The inventory studies of the river were initiated in 2001 
with the ANEEL’s authorisation and were concluded in November 2002 (Leme 2005a). 
The environmental licensing process then started in August 2003. 
EIA155/RIMA156 were carried out by Leme Engenharia Ltda. from 2003 to 2005, a period 
in which 156 on-site observation campaigns took place, guaranteeing the coverage of a 
complete hydrological cycle. The drafting of the studies entailed the participation of and 
contributions from several local and regional research institutes and organisations, such as 
the Federal University of Rondônia (palaeontology, hydrobiogeochemistry, vegetation, 
insects, medium-sized and large mammals, fish and fisheries, and social and economic 
aspects), the INPA (water quality, small mammals, reptiles and amphibians, large fish, 
birds, aquatic mammals, studies of vectors of medical interest), the Mineral Resources 
Research Company (geology, geomorphology, mineral resources, hydrogeology), the Mu-
seu Paraense Emílio Goeldi (pre-historic and historic archaeology), the Tropical Patholo-
gies Research Institute (evaluation of the health and condition of the riverside population) 
                                                 
153 It also considers the renewal of licences. 
154 This categorisation became possible with paragraph VI in the Article 2 of Law 9478/1997 under Law 
10848/2004. 
155 The EIA is a very detailed document, rich in information, having more then 1,500 pages plus annexes, 
maps, figures, etc. and an additional 321 pages describing environmental (including social) programmes. 
156 The RIMA is designed as a shorter, summary version of the EIA. The one carried out for this project is 
82 pages long. 
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and the NGO CPPT Cuniã (Centro de Pesquisas de Populações Tradicionais Cuniã – Re-
search Center for the Cuniã Traditional Populations) (interaction with riverside communi-
ties, communication of all the actions to be implemented from the study to the operation 
phase) (Leme 2005a). 
Following the scoping of the Terms of Reference, the EIA was designed to cover three 
characteristic areas: direct influence, indirect influence and regional coverage. The analy-
sis of the regional level addressed cumulative effects and possible synergies between the 
project and other activities in the same river basin, with specific regard to its Brazilian 
part. Besides meeting the requirements laid down in the terms the project proponent also 
carried out a Strategic Environmental Evaluation, which focused on political, commercial 
and environmental potentials throughout the Amazon region, addressing development and 
integration issues which might help to develop this region in the middle of South America. 
The concept of the Strategic Environmental Evaluation of the Madeira was consistent with 
the initiatives taken by the South American Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative 
(IIRSA)157 and was welcomed by the licensing authority and the Ministério Público. 
Before the Preliminary Licence was issued, the project proponent held four public hear-
ings in the region in November 2006 in accordance with IBAMA’s instructions. But this 
was not the first time the people were asked to participate. They were involved by the pro-
ject proponents before the terms of reference for the environmental studies were validated. 
During the EIA/RIMA phase Furnas and Odebrecht, on the other hand, held 64158 meet-
ings of local communities and affected people in order to disclose information on the pro-
ject and the process and to learn about the people’s expectations, anxieties and demands 
for participation. The information gathered in this process was passed to IBAMA and con-
tributed to the definition of the mitigation measures associated with the Preliminary Li-
cence,159 the appropriate documents being passed to local administrations, since the project 
proponents saw this information as a record of social demands that might help in the de-
sign and planning of public policies.160 Besides arranging these participative meetings, the 
project proponents presented the project and the process at a further 82 events161 (includ-
ing meetings, seminars and conferences) attended by a number of institutions, such as 
those of the Brazilian and Bolivian public administrations (at federal, state and municipal 
level, and in the three different branches), banking and international institutions, NGOs 
and universities.  
Resettlement issues to be covered by a Social Compensation Programme were addressed 
in the EIA/RIMA and discussed at the public hearings. As a result, the Preliminary Li-
cence was granted on the basis of the EIA/RIMA on condition that the project developer 
addressed his mitigation and compensatory measures in greater detail, setting out, for ex-
                                                 
157 T18092009. 
158 T180909. This experience inspired the production of a documentary film called “Vozes do Madeira” 
(The Madeira’s Voices) available at 
http://www.cemig.com.br/cemig2008/content/campanhaspublicitarias/empreendi-
mento_santo_antonio.asp (last accessed on 19 September 2009). 
159 I14092009 and T18092009. 
160 T18092009. 
161 The last of these events, which are listed in Table A.II.1 on pages II-13–15 Tomo A, Volume 1 of EIA 
(Leme 2005b), was held in September 2004. 
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ample, programmes and projects that reconcile the demand for and supply of public ser-
vices; mitigation measures for families that do not own land in the influence area the res-
ervoir, but whose economic activities would be affected; the support of resettlement initia-
tives related to the agrarian reform and initiatives for small farmers and riparian communi-
ties in the area influenced by the reservoir designed to develop environmentally sustain-
able activities; an action plan for the control of malaria; the consideration of the recom-
mendations made by FUNAI in the Programme of Support for Indigenous Communities; 
and support for the revision of Porto Velho’s urban plan. The Preliminary Licence con-
tained a total of 36 requirements to be met by the project developer in addition to those 
referred to in the EIA/RIMA (IBAMA 2007). 
The discussion of the environmental impacts became so intense that the MME commis-
sioned an independent study with support from the World Bank. The study was carried out 
by an international sedimentation expert,162 Sultan Alam, who recommended some 
changes to the project to minimise the problem of environmental impacts. In this context, 
it should be noted that the role of multilateral agencies in Brazil has shifted in recent 
years. The former director of the World Bank for Brazil, John Briscoe published an article 
in a Brazilian newspaper on 16 August 2008 pointing out that the World Bank was design-
ing a new model for engagement in the Amazonian region and indicating that its lack of 
enthusiasm for complex projects in sensitive biomes had often led to blockages in the 
process, preventing resources, knowledge and sustainable practices from reaching places 
where they were most needed as an alternative to predatory and uncontrolled development 
(Briscoe 2008). This may mean that the World Bank is focusing its know-how on improv-
ing the implementation of the development agenda and priorities set by developing coun-
tries. 
Following the issue of the Preliminary Licence and the auction, Santo Antônio Energia 
faced the task of designing the Basic Environmental Plan, detailing all the programmes 
and mitigation measures it intended to implement. Although BNDES was to provide a 
large part of the financing needed for the project, the fact that Banif and Santander were 
participating as equity holders led the company to consider the Equator Principles163 and 
the International Finance Corporation’s environmental guidelines while drawing up the 
PBA.164 
The UHE Santo Antônio’s PBA was approved by IBAMA in August 2008, when the in-
stallation licence was also issued. The PBA, another document which counted on the par-
ticipation of the same local and regional institutions that collaborated in the drafting of the 
EIA/RIMA, presents some 24 environmental programmes (and other subprogrammes), 
which may be grouped in four types: monitoring programmes, preservation and conserva-
tion programmes, impact reduction programmes and compensation programmes.165 
                                                 
162 Mitigation measures for this issue also form part of the 36 additional requirements attached to the Pre-
liminary License (IBAMA 2007).  
163 The consideration of these principles is also mentioned in the documentary film, “The Madeira’s 
Voices”. 
164 T180909. 
165 For more information, see http://www.santoantonioenergia.com.br. 
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The UHE Santo Antônio helps to illustrate how intricate dam decision-making has be-
come, involving several public and private agents, with their different priorities and pref-
erences. This is a case where the process has contributed to better outcomes (compared to 
previous experiences), considering the years of planning and of project discussion in a 
number of arenas. The strategy of contacting and informing the local population at earlier 
stages of the process has helped the project proponent to advance the licensing process, 
which may form a bottleneck in the decision-making process. 
The role of multilateral institutions also seems to have changed: the fact that they keep 
withdrawing from the financing of projects no longer constrains the process, since infra-
structure projects have been successfully backed by BNDES. On the other hand, the 
knowledge and expertise of multilateral institutions have helped the country’s develop-
ment strategies, priorities and agenda to achieve better results.  
The UHE Santo Antônio is also a good example of how environmental legislation and 
practices have been consolidated since the 1980s, while the economic stabilization 
achieved in the 1990s and the institutional reforms of the ESI since the beginning of this 
century have succeeded in attracting another type of foreign investor: banks and private 
equity funds. As the UHE Santo Antônio has shown, these agents may form a new group 
of international norm carriers. 
5 Summary and conclusions 
This paper has sought to analyse the main factors that persuade national decision-makers 
to internalise and apply international standards of sustainable dam development against 
the background of domestic political structures and political processes. Previous sections 
have covered the evolution of decision-making on hydropower since the advent of the 
present Federal Constitution in 1988, identifying political opportunities (CF/88, the liber-
alisation of the ESI in the 1990s and the reform of the ESI in 2003/2004), specific proc-
esses (and access points) and the agents involved (their support or criticisms and their role 
as norm carriers) with a view to explaining the possible internalisation of international 
standards. On the basis of the analyses undertaken in this paper, the three hypotheses ini-
tially adopted concerning possible internalisation paths will now be explicitly discussed in 
the light of the reflections that have been highlighted. 
It cannot be denied that the Brazilian government is committed to a wide variety of inter-
national agreements and involved in international forums where fundamental international 
norms, including those related to sustainable dam development, are discussed (good ex-
amples in this context being not only the International Conference for Renewable Energies 
that took place in Bonn in 2004, but also the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change and Agenda 21). The Brazilian govern-
ment is convinced that, especially because of their democratic and participative features, 
national legislation and practices are no less rigorous than anywhere else where hydro-
power plants are still being built and that new hydropower projects have led to the con-
struction of sustainable dams. Hence the Brazilian government’s reticence to show any 
particular interest in the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams. The confi-
dence in the country’s decision-making framework and dam-building procedures may jus-
tify this lack of interest (ANA 2001; 2003). Nevertheless, the role of the WCD as a cata-
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lyst for improving sustainable dam development for the sake of human beings is not ig-
nored (ANA 2001). 
The Agência Nacional das Águas – Brazilian Regulatory Water Agency (ANA) was con-
cerned about the right of veto claimed by the WCD for stakeholders, arguing that, in Bra-
zil, this would infringe the principles of Law 9433 of 1997, which instituted the National 
Policy of Water Resources, and would also be incompatible with the participatory deci-
sion-making process in force.  
In 2002 the Ministry of Environment issued a joint ministerial order (MMA 2002), signed 
by the Ministers of Mines and Energy and of Foreign Relations, setting up a working 
group composed of representatives of the two ministries to draw up a statement by the 
Brazilian government on its position on the WCD report. The statement written by the 
working group was sent to the Minister of Environment in March 2003 (ANA 2003) and 
acknowledged the contribution of the report in systematising values and strategic priorities 
to be considered in decision-making on dams and in catalysing the global debate on the 
role of dams in the development process, pointing out, however, that the case studies on 
which the report was based were not representative of existing dams, most of which were 
old. It also noted that the proposals made in the WCD report had been incorporated in 
Brazilian legislation long before the WCD had come into existence. It also addressed the 
issue of option assessment: 
“An additional error of the Report is the absence of a systematic comparison of the 
environmental and socio-economic costs of dams as compared to the available alter-
natives for energy generation: nuclear plants and thermoelectric plants based on gas 
or coal (…). [Brazil proposes that a comparison should be made of the] socio-
economic and environmental sustainability of dams with feasible alternatives that 
would provide the population with the same multiple services: electricity, flood pro-
tection, navigation, domestic and industrial water supply as well as food production” 
(ANA 2003, 8–9). 
Despite this political strategy of not accepting the WCD’s recommendations as strict di-
rectives, it is possible to find comments on them (primarily as food for thought rather than 
a manual to be followed) in official publications of the energy sector (e.g. MME 2007, 19, 
623, 638). Although little reference is made to the WCD report in official documents and 
statements, some discursive effects166 in Brazil can be discerned (Dingwerth 2007): it has 
influenced the discourse of the anti-dam movements,167 although other Brazilian social 
movements make little mention of these recommendations;168 and it has influenced the 
discourse of international NGOs active in Brazil and of governments of the developed 
                                                 
166 Some interviewees also claimed that the WCD recommendations had had a wider effect in that it had 
reached a normative and even a material level. Something of a normative effect was detected in the 
planning of the energy sector, where the WCD recommendations had been used as a reference in the 
adoption of premises, criteria and procedures, although there is no agreement on all the recommenda-
tions (I12022009). Some best practices have been adopted by the electricity sector, but this had already 
been a trend before the WCD published its recommendations and was not necessarily due to its work 
(I12022009; I13032009). A material effect was mentioned by one interviewee, who believed that it was 
due to the WCD report that investment in new hydropower plants had risen, as the growing number of 
hydropower projects under construction worldwide showed (see World Bank 2009).  
167 I16012009, I30012009, I06022009, I13032009, I25032009. 
168 I13022009a, I12032009b. 
 Agnes Maria de Aragão da Costa 
46 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
world against large hydropower projects as a renewable source of energy has been lim-
ited.169 
If the WCD is taken as an example, the government’s embeddedness in international insti-
tutions does not therefore seem to be a determinant cause of the internalisation of interna-
tional standards, notwithstanding the influences of globalisation and other international 
trends: Brazil is rather a case in which recent changes in the environmental field (and to 
related procedures) are more attributable to a general process of democratisation and in-
ternal policy learning. 
On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, although the hydropower strategy may 
constitute a policy of the Brazilian State, all governments from the 1990s onwards have 
appreciated the importance of private national and foreign capital and have therefore been 
committed to creating a credible investment environment that goes beyond a guarantee of 
stable macroeconomic bases. This has not been an easy task and has necessitated the re-
form of the ESI on two occasions: in the mid-1990s and in 2003/2004. The “reform of the 
reform” addressed several issues related to the business of attracting investment (such as 
the design of auctions and related long-term PPAs; compliance with contracts concluded 
within a previous framework; a guarantee of funding from BNDES on competitive terms), 
but where the specific issue of sustainable dams is concerned, what was most important 
was a guarantee of the environmental (including social) feasibility of any hydropower pro-
ject before it was handed over to a private and170/or public project developer.171 This was a 
necessary change and recognition that Brazil’s environmental licensing process is com-
plex, rife with opportunities for vetoes and therefore unpredictable, a process that does not 
necessarily attract private investment, according to the World Bank’s analysis (2008). 
This leads us to the next hypothesis on the role of social mobilisation in society. As this 
paper and Hochstetler / Keck (2007) argue, social mobilisation and environmental aware-
ness (which endorses the value of sustainable dams) are two closely linked phenomena in 
Brazil, each of which has reinforced the other’s goals since the democratisation of the 
1980s. The Movement of Dam-Affected People is a clear example of a product of this 
process, as the analysis by Rothman / Oliver (2002) shows. This has created fertile soil for 
the dissemination of the sustainable dam discourse, whatever its origins.  
As for the internalisation of international standards,  
1. the constant relationship between national social and environmental movements and 
NGOs and their international counterparts since that time,  
2. added to international funding for their activities and especially for some activities of 
the State in the environmental sphere in the 1980s and 1990s,  
3. combined with the continuous transit of individuals (an explicit example of norm car-
riers) from the environmental sphere to different positions according to the moment 
(working within the administration or for the administration – as consultants or part-
                                                 
169 I06022009. 
170 Through special purpose companies. 
171 Through the obtention of preliminary license (the most critical license) prior to the energy auctions. 
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ners of the administration in NGOs – or in NGOs opposed to a certain administration), 
and172 
4. added to the growing power and legitimacy of the Ministério Público, because of its 
responsibility for protecting diffuse rights and its symbiotic relationship with organ-
ised civil society,173 
formed a pathway for the internalisation of international best practices and values in Bra-
zilian environmental legislation and practices and thus had normative, discursive, regula-
tory and material effects. And as no hydropower plant is built unless the requirements of 
the environmental licensing process are satisfied and its procedures are completed, this 
confluence of phenomena has irrevocably affected decision-making on the construction of 
new hydropower plants. 
The requirements of the environmental licensing process must be satisfied and the proce-
dures associated with it must be completed not only because they are legally mandatory, 
but particularly because of the access points and opportunities for vetoes which this proc-
ess entails: as the process involves innumerable institutions, agents and actors at the three 
levels of the federation and the three branches of the political system, which do not have 
the same interests, priorities and values and as all decisions (at the various stages of the 
environmental licensing process and of the life cycle of the project itself) may be ques-
tioned by the Ministério Público or by social movements and NGOs in the form of asso-
ciations and then taken to court, the less visible the process is, the greater the possibility of 
its outcome being unpredictable. In this regard, it has become easier and quicker to act in 
accordance with all the rules governing the process, satisfying all its requirements, al-
though this does not prevent some institutions with a contrary view from obstructing the 
process, since the deadlines for decisions at each stage are not clearly defined. 
As evidence of how these access points may also work as opportunities for exercising ve-
toes, of the 40 or so in 2003 still unbuilt hydropower projects (despite the granting of con-
cession rights prior to 2003), 13 remain unbuilt in 2010 either because of questions raised 
during the environmental licensing process or because the environmental agency declared 
them environmentally non-viable). 
As a consequence, the coordinating function of the Casa Civil has been reinforced at least 
at the level of the federal executive branch. On the other hand, the creation of the EPE and 
the delegation to it of the task of undertaking feasibility studies and EIAs/RIMAs of future 
hydropower plants may be seen as a first attempt to guarantee that all requirements are 
met. 
In view of the fact  
— that one common argument for questioning the process is that affected people have 
not been informed or able to participate as required by law and norms and 
                                                 
172 As presented by Bernardo (2001). 
173 As addressed by Lopes (2000). 
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— that their lack of information added to their usual mistrust of the administration174 
turn them into a “mass of political manoeuvre,”175 since they are more susceptible to 
ideologies and arguments, 
the participation of the affected communities since the early stages of the licensing process 
for the UHE Santo Antônio, in which they also relied on the cooperation of a local NGO 
to facilitate this contact, may serve as an example of what needs to be done in the future to 
avoid questioning of the process.  
Regardless of the pressures created by the development of the national environmental in-
stitutional framework, the internalisation of international standards also occurred in the 
energy field (including the ESI) because of the reliance of domestic dam developers – un-
til recent years, state-owned companies – on foreign financial services requiring the appli-
cation of international standards, inducing domestic decision-makers to implement inter-
national standards, which confirms the third hypothesis of this paper. This also accounts 
for the creation of areas within Eletrobras dedicated to the environmental field and of spe-
cific methodologies to address this issue in the budgets of hydropower plants (Conta 10), 
as this paper argues. The long planning experience of the sector, together with its need to 
comply with requirements laid down by international financiers (multilateral agents, ex-
port credit agencies and foreign banks), has moulded a planning policy that considers 
socio-environmental and participative issues, as this paper has shown. 
Two of the four cases analysed above indicate this direct influence: the UHE Itaparica and 
the UHE Cana Brava. Although the UHE Balbina relied on foreign suppliers’ credit, no 
reference was found to specific requirements regarding socio-environmental aspects. The 
last case, the UHE Santo Antônio is, on the other hand, emblematic: the Equator Princi-
ples were taken into account because the foreign banks acting as equity investors in the 
project were signatories to them.  
Consequently, five observations on international norm diffusion through foreign financial 
services and expertise are possible:  
1. Recent Brazilian administrations have put an enormous effort into creating an invest-
ment environment that succeeds in attracting private capital. In this respect, investors 
are free to apply the best practices they choose, provided that they are not inconsistent 
with national legislation and norms. The initiative of the International Hydropower 
Association may serve as an example of this trend, as long as its recommendations 
bind industry agents and not governments. Private investors may now play the role that 
international financial institutions played in the past as international norm carriers. 
2. The relevance of international financing has waned in Brazil’s recent history owing to 
the macroeconomic stability that has been achieved and to the growing role and size of 
BNDES (the last two power plants analysed in the case studies received significant 
funding from BNDES). 
                                                 
174 Addressed by Scott (2006).  
175 Not all NGOs or social movements that contact affected people and propose that they act as their repre-
sentatives are legitimately interested in their concerns and expectations. 
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3. International financial institutions, on the other hand, seem to be a better target for 
social movements and NGOs, as the UHE Cana Brava has shown. A likely reason for 
this is that every incident involving these institutions may act as an international shop 
window for local problems, giving them an international dimension. This means that 
these institutions may also be regarded as another channel through which social mobi-
lisation succeeds in influencing practices. This finding has implications for past and 
future projects. 
4. However, the internalisation of international standards may also occur through the 
expertise of the international financial institutions that support studies on the construc-
tion of new hydropower plants. It should again be pointed out that this is not a pre-
rogative of financial institutions, foreign research institutes having always been in-
volved in such studies, as the UHE Balbina and UHE Itaparica demonstrate. Neverthe-
less, these cases also serve to illustrate that the involvement of international agents in 
the past did not suffice to guarantee the construction of sustainable dams. 
5. The World Bank’s recent endorsement of the MME in studies on the UHE Santo 
Antônio illustrates that the role of development cooperation agencies may be boosted 
and may also contribute to much better and more balanced results if they accept the 
strategies of the countries they intend to support, a view highlighted by Briscoe 
(2008). This is because what singles out these institutions is that they concentrate 
within themselves the most qualified portfolio of specialists in development policies. 
This know-how is much needed in developing countries, where the professionalisation 
and qualification of the State is still a work in progress. 
To conclude, while the contribution made by international influence to the framing of Bra-
zilian environmental awareness, legislation and practices is undeniable, the social content 
of Brazilian environmentalism and its political implications are also a feature of the col-
lective identity that is typical of Brazil. The country’s recent democratisation and eco-
nomic history have formed a State that is conscious of its considerable strength, which 
legitimises its actions: it is supported by a political system that extols democratic and par-
ticipative values. 
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